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7.2 Declared States

In the game of comparing nuclear arsenal sizes a number of different methods of measurement can be used. The most popular are the number of warheads, and the total megatonnage of the arsenal. Number of warheads is meaningful when each warhead is large enough to destroy the target it is used against. Targets large enough to require many warheads are relatively few in number, even if the warheads are small (as nuclear weapons go), so warhead number is a fairly good indicator of the effective arsenal size. Megatonnage provides a more direct measure of the gross destructive power of the arsenal, and is especially important for estimating long range effects (like fallout). Since the destructive potential of a nuclear weapon is not necessarily proportional to its size, an alternative to total megatonnage has been proposed called equivalent megatonnage. The equivalent megatonnage of a warhead is its yield in megatons raised to the two-thirds power: Y^(2/3). This metric assumes that blast is the important destructive effect, as it is against most structures. The area affected by the thermal flash is directly proportional to size however, and this casualty producing effect thus dominates in large weapons.

An additional complication in discussing arsenal sizes with respect to Russia is its large number of retired warheads from its Cold War arsenal that have yet to be dismantled (few U.S. warheads remain that have not been dismantled). Both nations thus have large numbers of superfluous weapons that have yet to be dismantled, but are not part of their official arsenals. Information about these inventories of these retired weapons are available for the U.S., but is spotty at best for Russia. But these weapons do still exist and could be put back into service on short notice if the decision to do so were made. Even after dismantlement, the expensive nuclear materials will still exist, often in the form of fabricated weapons components, and manufacturing new weapons from them could be undertaken more rapidly than could be done from scratch.

7.2.1 United States of America

On 1 October 1998 a new SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan), known as SIOP-99 went into effect. The SIOP is the comprehensive policy guidance for employing nuclear weapons. SIOP-99 was the first new operational plan since SIOP-81 was enacted at the beginning of the Reagan Era, and was drafted in response to Presidential Decision Directive 60, signed by President Clinton in November 1997.

Since the invention of nuclear weapons, the U.S. has built about 70,000 warheads, and dismantled about 58,000 of them with most of the nuclear materials being recycled into new weapons. The U.S. currently has about 12,500 weapons in existence, but only 8700 (approx.) are in active service. The remaining 3800 or so are retired weapons either awaiting dismantlement, making up part of the inactive reserve, or both. Some counts give somewhat lower numbers for operational weapons (e.g. 7200), but the weapons making up this differential are simply "in storage", have not been transferred to reserve status, and are in full operational condition. At its numeric peak in 1967, the U.S. arsenal had some 32,500 warheads.

The U.S. has produced no new nuclear warheads in the past ten years (the last fissile bomb core was fabricated in December 1989, the last weapon was assembled 31 July 1990). The U.S. is nearing the end of the dismantlement effort begun several years ago, and has no plans at present for building any new nuclear weapons, or any new strategic delivery systems. Existing warheads have been modified however, creating for example the B61 Mod-11 tactical bomb, and remanufacturing of existing warheads to extend their service life is expected. If START II is implemented, by 2007 the U.S. plans to have about 4450 warheads in service (the last time there were fewer than this was in 1957 when 5828 warheads existed) with a combined hedge stockpile and inactive reserve of an additional 5000 warheads. The hedge stockpile will contain fully operational weapons that are kept in storage away from their delivery systems (so that they are not immediately available), there are currently no weapons assigned to this category. The inactive reserve contains weapons that are intact but not in operational condition. Extensive work may be required to return an inactive weapon to service (e.g. expansion of tritium production facilities, followed by stockpiling of additional tritium; modification of inactive warheads to mate with current delivery systems, etc.). 350 W-84 warheads are currently assigned to the inactive reserve.

On 1 March 1995, President Clinton declared 212.5 tonnes of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium to be excess to national security needs. Since that time additional information about the amount, locations, and forms of this material has been released. The excess plutonium (38.2 tonnes) is stored at 10 locations in Washington, Idaho, Colorado, New Mexico (two locations), Texas, Ohio, New York, Tennessee and South Carolina. The HEU (174.3 tonnes) is stored at six locations in Washington, Idaho, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas and South Carolina. It is expected that the HEU will be blended with natural uranium to produce some 7000 tonnes of civilian power plant fuel over 8-10 years. About 10 tonnes of HEU has already been placed under international safeguards at the Oak Ridge Y-12 site.

The excess HEU consists of 33 tonnes of >92% enrichment material (originally used or intended for weapon primary cores), and 142 tonnes of 20-92% enrichment material (much of it used or intended for thermonuclear secondaries). No HEU for weapons use has been produced since 1964, and production of HEU for use in naval reactors ended in 1991 with future needs to be met from the stockpile.

On 6 February 1996 U.S. Dept. of Energy declassified significant additional information about plutonium stocks and their location. It was disclosed that since 1944 the U.S. produced or acquired 111.4 tonnes of plutonium, principally for weapons programs. 93.5% was produced in government reactors, 5% was imported from 14 countries and 1.5% arose from commercial reactors.

89.3% of the 111.4 tonnes produced or acquired remains in the DOE/Department of Defense inventory (99.5 tonnes). The balance consists of plutonium used in the Nagasaki bomb and in weapons tests (3.4 tonnes, 3.1%), waste (3.1%), inventory differences (2.5%), fission and transmutation (1.1%), transfer to foreign countries (0.6%), decay (0.4%) and distribution to the civilian nuclear industry (0.1%).

Of the 99.5 tonnes in current inventory, 85 tonnes is weapons-grade plutonium (less than 7% Pu-240), 13.2 tonnes is "fuel-grade" (7-19% Pu-240) and 1.3 tonnes is reactor-grade (over 19% Pu-240) material. 38.2 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium was declared excess inventory, and will be disposed of. The remaining 46.8 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium includes 32 tonnes of plutonium contained in weapons still in the U.S. stockpile, and 5000 pits from disassembled weapons as part of a strategic reserve. Of the excess inventory: 55.8% (26.1 tonnes) is located Pantex - almost all in the form of fabricated weapon pits; 31.2% is located at Rocky Flats, and is thus inaccessible for weapons use at present since the facility has been shut down; most of the remaining 13% is distributed between Hanford, Los Alamos, and Savannah River.

A total of 90.5 tonnes of weapon grade plutonium was produced by the U.S. 54.5 tonnes of this was produced at Hanford, 36 tonnes was produced at Savannah River.

Three countries provided the bulk of the foreign-derived material: United Kingdom (5,384 kilograms), Canada (254.5 kg) and Taiwan (79.1 kg). 749 kilograms of plutonium that was transferred to 39 foreign countries between 1959 and 1991 under the U.S. "Atoms for Peace" program. The plutonium was used for a variety of civilian purposes, primarily power reactor development under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision.

The strategic reserve also contains thermonuclear secondary stages from disassembled weapons, in addition to the 5000 pits. These secondaries contain enriched uranium (in the sparkplug and fissile tamper) and lithium-6 deuteride. When weapons are disassembled at Pantex the secondaries are shipped to Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, where the Y-12 plant that manufactured them is located. Some of the secondaries are dismantled, but others are retained as part of the strategic reserve. The number retained for this purpose is not known, but may perhaps match the number of pits in the reserve.

Despite the halt in weapons manufacture and testing, and the draw down in weapon stockpiles, the U.S. has expressed no interest in abandoning nuclear weapons (and netiher has any of the other nuclear weapons states). To maintain the existing weapon stockpile, and an infrastructure capable of weapon development, production and testing, an ambitious research and construction program has been developed. This program maintains the level of funds devoted to the nuclear weapons related programs at the DOE at about the same level as during the Cold War. The content of this program has been summarized by the DOE as follows:

• The conduct of a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program to insure a high level of confidence in the active stockpile, including the conduct of a broad range of effective and continuing experimental programs.
• The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain, and ensure the continued application of our human scientific resources to those programs on which our continued progress in nuclear technology depends.
• The maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities prohibited by the CTBT should the United States cease to be bound to adhere to this treaty.
• Continuation of a comprehensive research and development program to improve our treaty monitoring capabilities and operations.
• The continuing development of a broad range of intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities and operations to ensure accurate and comprehensive information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons development programs, and related nuclear programs.
• The understanding that if the President of the United States is informed by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy (DOE) -- advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command -- that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type which the two Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation with Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard "supreme national interests" clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be required.

Under this program the national weapons laboratories are continuing to devise new weapon designs and modifications. Los Alamos is developing a replacement warhead for Trident II Mk5 reentry vehicle. Lawrence Livermore is studying the reuse of old weapons pits in new weapon designs. Both labs are working on adding state-of-the-art safety features to some weapons that now lack them.

7.2.1.1 Current Nuclear Forces
The U.S. is currently wrapping up an interim consolidation of its strategic forces, a process set in motion by the unilateral demobilization of thousands of nuclear weapons by Pres. Bush on 27 Sept. 1991. A planned force reduction envisioned by the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to complying with the provisions of the START II treaty, originally to be completed by 5 December 2001 and then extended by Helsinki agreement until the end of 2007, is now on hold indefinitely. In April 2000 START II was finally ratified by the Russian Duma after a seven year delay, but with additional conditions that require approval from the U.S. Senate. Congressional legislation had previously prohibited complying with the START II prescribed force levels until the treaty went into force (a requirement that required an additional $104 million in the FY 2000 budget), and no hearings or votes on the Duma-imposed conditions have yet been scheduled. The status of START II and its force reduction time table thus remains in limbo at the start of 2001. The U.S. military is on record favoring the introduction of further force reductions -- particularly the planned decommissioning of four submarines -- to save costs regardless of formal treaties.

In any case the START I and START II treaties, like the SALT treaties before them, use strategic delivery vehicles and delivery vehicle loadings as the unit of accountability. This practice was originally instituted due to mutual suspicion and secrecy during the Cold War since delivery vehicles could be counted by satellite, and their configurations confirmed by occasional surprise examination. Nuclear weapons (warheads) per se were not counted. This remains true under START I and II, the limits set are calculated in terms of agreed upon counting rules for delivery vehicles and loadings. Thus there are no restrictions placed on the number of actual nuclear weapons, operational or otherwise, that can be stockpiled by either power, and no restrictions on many types of tactical nuclear warheads. Accordingly the 1994 NPR specified that the U.S. will actually maintain an intact stockpile of some 10,500 weapons, known as the Enduring Stockpile, in various stages of readiness even if and when START II goes into full effect. This is an inventory some four times the officially calculated 2000-2500 deployed strategic warhead limit for START II (for START I the level is 3500). Until such time as other treaties are concluded, or a future posture review makes a unilateral revision, this stockpile level will be maintained indefinitely.

There are currently nine warhead types in the Enduring Stockpile. Each of the two national weapons labs is responsible for the stewardship of the warhead types that they developed. Los Alamos National Laboratory is responsible for five warheads - the B61, W76, W78, W80, and W88. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is responsible for four - the W62, W84, W87, and B83.

In assessing nuclear force levels a distinction should be made between the forces that are in service and the forces that are actually available at any given time. Since weapon systems require maintenance, and crews that operate them require training, a certain portion of nuclear delivery systems are normally unavailable for either or both of these reasons. The percentage of the total force affected by these considerations is lowest for the ICBM force, which has an an availability rate on the order of 99%. The other legs of the triad have lower rates of availability.

U.S. ICBMs and those SLBMs at sea are maintained on continuous alert, but are not targeted at any specific country. The missiles could, however, be returned to their previous targeting status on short notice. The bomber force is no longer maintained on constant "strip alert", although it could be returned to alert status within a few days if necessary.

ICBMs

The US ICBM force consists of 500 Minute Man III missiles, and 50 Peacekeeper (MX) missiles deployed at three bases (down from four). Under START II the 50 Peacekeeper missiles were scheduled to be deactivated with the US relying solely on the Minuteman III as a land-based ICBM. This deactivation had been on hold, though with contingency programs to implement it continuing. In the FY 2002 budget (which begins 1 Oct. 2001) submitted to congress by Sec. of Defense Rumsfeld however , proposed to reture all of them at a savings of about $70 million a year. The MM III force is now based at Malmstrom AFB, Montana (200 missiles in the 10th, 12th, 490th, and 564th missile squadrons of the 341st Space Wing); Minot AFB, North Dakota (150 missiles in the 740th, 741st, and 742nd missile squadrons of the 91st Space Wing); and F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming (150 missiles in the 319th, 320th, and 321st missile squadrons of the 90th Space Wing). Warren also hosts the sole Peacekeeper squadron (50 missiles, of the 400th missile squadron also of the 90th Space Wing). Each squadron controls 50 missiles, which are divided in to five "flights" of 10 missiles. There are five underground launch control centers (LCCs) in a squadron, each LCC is responsible for monitoring the operational status of one flight. For redundancy every LCC in a squadron is capable of commanding the launch of every missile in the squadron; to ensure secure control two LCCs (or an airborne LCC aboard a EC-135) must command the launch of a missile before it will fire.

The redeployment of MM III missiles from Grand Forks AFB in North Dakota was completed 3 June 1998. Destruction of the inactivated silos and launch control centers (LCCs) by explosive demolition as required by START I began at Grand Forks in 1999. The first silo, near Langdon, North Dakota, was destroyed 6 October 1999 with 14 demolished by the end of that year. The process will be completed by 1 December 2001.

The 150 previously deactivated Minuteman II silos and LCCs at Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota have already been destroyed. On 13 September 1996 the 149th former silo was blown up at Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota. The 150th and last silo at Ellsworth became the Minuteman Missile National Historic Site on 29 November 1999. The MM II silo demolition program was completed at Whiteman AFB, Missouri (still home to some 550 strategic bombs) in December 1997. The fate of the MM II silos at Grand Forks are currently being debated, it has been proposed that some them could used by a National Missile Defense (NMD) system.

When (if) the START II treaty goes into force, the MM III force will be downloaded to one warhead each. START I limits already restrict warhead loading and some MM IIs have been downloaded to one warhead to comply with START I. If Peacekeeper is deactivated under START II the Mark 21 RV/W-87 warhead will be redeployed on to MM IIIs. The W-87 has superior safety features over the warheads it will replace such as insensitive high explosive, a fire resistant pit, and ENDS (enhanced nuclear detonation system) which offers better security. Some W-87s have already been placed on MM III missiles, perhaps using some of the reserve W-87s not deployed on Peacekeepers. The Air Force is eager to retire the W-62 warhead from active service.

The responsibility for maintaining the ICBM force has been contracted out now, to TRW Inc., for a possible 15 year term running through 2012 at a cost of $3.4 billion (less than what the Air Force expected to spend). TRW is also managing the three-part upgrade program for the MM III force. Since the average age of the MM III inventory already exceeds 25 years (last one assembled 11/30/78), a U.S.$5.2 billion program is refurbishing them and extend their life to 2020. The first part of the program has already been completed, in which the MM III launch control centers (LCCs) were upgraded with Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) consoles developed for the MX Peacekeeper program. The second part of the program involves upgrading the electronics and guidance system for the Minuteman. Between 1998 and 2002 a total of 652 new guidance units will be produced for the MM III fleet. These guidance units are the same Advanced Inertial Reference System (AIRS) developed for the Peacekeeper and will enhance MM III accuracy to a comparable or better CEP of 100 m. The third part of the program is the "Propulsion Replacement Program" which will remanufacture the solid fuel boosters, including repouring the solid propellant, using state-of-the-art techniques. The first remanufactured missile was successfully launched from Vandenberg AFB on 13 November 1999.

Although the USAF expects the Minuteman III force to remain in service until 2020, it has begun exploratory work on developing a replacement. One suggstion has been to revive the now cancelled SICBM (small ICBM) and base it in MM III silos.

SSBNs and SLBMs

With the return to port by the USS Florida (SSBN 728) from operational patrol on 25 May 2001, the U.S. Navy strategic submarine force completed its 3500th Fleet Ballistic Missiles (FBM) patrol. The first of the 3,500 FBM patrols dates back to 15 November 1960, when the USS George Washington (SSBN 598) deployed on her first operational mission carrying 16 Polaris A1 missiles. Since that time there have been 1245 Polaris patrols, 1182 Poseidon patrols, 826 Trident I patrols, and 247 Trident II patrols. The total time on patrol amounts to some 245,000-mission days or some 671 years of combined service.

The Ohio class SSBNs are the only ballistic missile submarines still in the U.S. arsenal, all subs belonging to older classes have been decommissioned or converted to other uses. The first Ohio class submarine, the Ohio (SSBN 726) was launched 7 April 1979 and commissioned 11 November 1981. All of the 18 planned boats have now been commissioned. The final boat, the Louisiana (SSBN 743), was commissioned on 6 September 1997. The first 8 Ohio class subs were equipped with the Trident I missile. Starting with the 9th boat, the Tennessee, commissioned in March 1990, subsequent subs have been equipped with the D-5 Trident (Trident II). The Ohio fleet is based at Bangor, Washington (Submarine Group 9, consisting of a single squadron of 8 boats) and Kings Bay, Georgia (Submarine Group 10, consisting of a squadrons No. 16 and 20 each with 5 boats). Currently only Kings Bay supports the Trident II, which reached its full strength of 10 boats with the Louisiana.

Under START II and the NPR the oldest 4 subs (the Ohio, Michigan, Florida and the Georgia) would be retired for a fleet of 14. The remaining 4 Trident I boats (the Alaska, Nevada, Jackson and the Alabama) will be converted to use the Trident II, allowing the Trident I missile to be retired. The first submarine to be designated for backfit with the Trident II was the Alaska (SSBN 732) in 1998, with the upgrade to take place during regular depot maintenance in September 2000. The contract for the second upgrade, the U.S.S. Nevada (SSBN 733), of $62.8 million was awarded in January 1999. The retrofit program is to be completed in FY 2005. Trident II procurement continues with funds allocated in the FY 2001 budget (12 missiles), now the only U.S. strategic missile production program. The USN is planning for a life extension for the Ohio class, giving the boats a service life of 42 years (to around 2030) and is planning life extension for the Trident II to match.

Bangor is due to being a 10 year $5 billion upgrade beginning in 2001 to equip it to support the Trident II. Beginning in 2002 three boats will be shifted from Kings Bay to Bangor so that both bases will support 7 boats each.

On 26 June 2001, a triple launch of Trident II missiles from the USS Louisiana (SSBN 743) brought the Navy to the remarkable total of 94 consecutive launchs of the Trident II without a failure. Of the 116 Trident II flight tests since 1987, only five have failed, and none since December 1989. This makes the Trident II the most reliable strategic nuclear missiles ever developed.

Due to the delay of the Russian Duma in ratifying START II, the decommissioning of the four oldest Trident II subs had been in doubt. On 5 January 1999 Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. J.L. Johnson, testified to congress that the costs of keeping them is service past their planned decommissioning dates is prohibitive due to the need for costly refueling, remarks later echoed by Secretary of Defense Cohen - signalling that with or without START II, the Navy intended to decommission them, or retire them from nuclear service, starting in 2002; a position that has been reaffirmed by the Bush administration. The boats may be eliminated entirely from service, or they may be reassigned to non-nuclear roles. Conversion to a combined special operations and cruise missile launcher role has been discussed; two of the 24 launch tubes would be converted to handle special ops vehicles and the remaining 22 would house 7 cruise missiles each (for a total of 154).

Under Start I, the Trident II is limited to 8 warheads (its design capability is 14 or more). This lower loading extends its range to over 11000 km. START II will lower the loading to five each, further extending the range. The extended timetable for START II agreed to at Helsinki would require that there be no more than 2160 SLBM warheads (down from the current 3456), or five per missile for a fleet of 18, by the end of 2004; and no more than 1750 by the end of 2007.

The United States maintains two full crews for each SSBN, with about 60 percent of operational SSBNs (9 or 10 boats) routinely at sea, with about 50 percent being actually on patrol. The SSBN fleet operates on a 112 day cycle with a 77 day patrol followed by a 35 day refit period. On average, about 10 percent of U.S. SSBNs (one to two) are undergoing long-term overhauls at any given time, and thus are not available for immediate use. Usually half the patrolling boats (4 or 5) are on "hard alert", that is in their patrol area and within range of all their targets. The other boats are on "modified alert" which means in transit, going to or returning from patrol, and are available for combat although with poorer target coverage. The U.S. Navy disclosed early in 1998 that at that time the actual patrol loading is an average of 5 warheads per missile (thus 480 warheads are kept on hard alert), perhaps for the range advantage provided.

Bombers

The U.S. bomber inventory (like that other combat aircraft) is organized ("coded") into three nested categories: TAI (total aircraft inventory), PAI (primary aircraft inventory), and PMAI (primary mission aircraft inventory). TAI comprises all aircraft in service, PAI is normally a smaller number than TAI, it designates those aircraft available to units to fulfill various functions but omits aircraft held as attrition replacements and reconstitution reserves. PMAI is a smaller number that PAI, it is the PMAI aircraft that form the authorized fighting structure of the Air Force. PMAI denotes aircraft that are "combat coded" - authorized to combat units for the performance of the unit's basic missions; it excludes aircraft maintained for other purposes such as training and testing. PMAI are fully funded in terms of operations and maintenance, load crews, and spare parts, and are available for immediate deployment. All bombers in inventory, including those in reserve, are kept in flyable condition and receive planned modifications.

The total aircraft inventory of 93 remaining B-1B Lancers (out of an original production run of 100) have been converted to a conventional bombing role and by the end of 1997 had been phased out as part of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces. While they are not available for nuclear missions on short notice, with modification they can be returned to strategic nuclear duty if desired, and are accountable under START-I delivery vehicle limits. 70 B-1s are PMAI, and 12 are typically assigned to training duty (PAI is 82). In the FY 2002 budget, the Bush administration proposed reducing the B-1 force to 60 for a saving of $165 million in 2002. The money saved would be reinvested in the remaining B-1s for upgrades. On 1 August 2001 however the House Armed Services Committee voted 33-26 to block the Air Force plan to cut the B-1 bomber force at the instigation of the the representatives from the states where they are based.

The force of B-52 Stratofortresses (popularly called the BUFF) has been scaled back to a total inventory of 94 planes, all of them B-52Hs (out of an original 104 H models). This is actually increase from the early 90s, with additional B-52s being returned to service in recent years. In FY 2001 this these 94 TAI aircraft are programmed to decline to a fleet of 76 bombers. Of this fleet 56 are counted as PAI, 44 are allocated to PMAI (the PMAI figure is unchanged from previous recent years), and 12 are normally training coded. The 20 non-PAI aircraft are for attrition replacements, reconstitution reserves, or test aircraft. Despite its age (the last was delivered in October 1962) the B-52H airframe is estimated to be good for service at least to 2030 (this is 83 years after the B-52 program's inception!). Maintaining an operational inventory this long however requires alotting a substantial number for attrition through the rest of the B-52's service life. There is a continuing program of retrofits and upgrades to maintain the combat effectiveness of these aircraft, all 76 inventory aircraft being kept up-to-date.

The B-52H force is based at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana and Minot AFB, North Dakota. Barksdale AFB supports the 11th, 20th, and 96th Bomb Squadrons of the 2nd Bomb Wing with a total of 58 B-52Hs. Minot AFB hosts 5th Bomb Wing with 35 planes, and two test aircraft are kept at Edwards AFB, California. With the transfer of the B-1B to conventional duty the B-52H is now the only cruise missile (ACM and ALCM) capable carrier aircraft.

All 21 of the Northrop Grumman B-2A Spirit aircraft have now been delivered to the Air Force, The 21st and last new production plane was delivered in January 1998. Aircraft have been sent back for upgrades to the current Block 30 standard operational configuration from the original Block 10 and test configurations even as deliver proceeded. By the end of June 2000 the 20 production version planes had all been converted to the Block 30 standard operational configuration, the 20th having been deivered on 29 June, and were available for service. The last aircraft to be converted is the B-2 test plane whose conversion is scheduled for completion by September 2002. The Block 30 modification provides the B-2 with the ability to carry all types of strategic nuclear bombs (i.e. the B61-7, B61-11, B83, and B83-1 bombs) and a variety of conventional bombs (including the Mk 84), missiles, and other munitions. Cruise missiles are not supported however. Of the 21 TAI B-2s, 16 are PMAI aircraft.

The first operational B-2 was delivered to the 509th Bombardment Wing (the same unit that flew the atomic bombing missions against Japan in WWII) at Whiteman AFB, Missouri 17 December 1993. The 509th is composed of the 393rd and 325th Bomb Squadrons. The first full squadron (the 393rd) did not become became operational until 1 April 1997. The 325th Bomb Squadron became operational on 8 January 1998. In March 1998 the B-2s participated in their first major exercise when they deployed to Andersen AFB, Guam for 10 days. A year later, on 24 March 1999 they saw combat for the first time when two B-2s flying a round-trip, 30-hour mission from - and back to - Whiteman AFB, Mo., dropped a combined 32 Joint Direct Attack Munitions on Yugoslavia in the opening hours of Operation Allied Force.

With reductions in the size of the combat coded strategic bomber force (44 B-52s and 16 B-2s) increasing number of operational nuclear weapons have been put in storage since they exceed the number necessary to fully load the combat-ready force. The maximum load is 1136 weapons (of which no more than 880 can be cruise missiles). The number of potential bombs and missiles with nuclear warheads totals 2060 (and omitting the 750 tactically assigned B-61 bombs).

U.S. OPERATIONAL STOCKPILE: JULY 1998
This stockpile includes all weapons actually deployed on delivery vehicles, all weapons that are certified and kept ready for use, and a modest set of certified spares that are used to replace ready-for-use weapons when these are taken off duty for inspection or maintenance.

As of July 1998, the active U.S. stockpile consists of the following weapons:
WARHEAD/WEAPON          FIRST    YIELD (kt) USER   NUMBER TOTAL YIELD (MAX) 
                      PRODUCED                             Mt   Equiv. Mt
STRATEGIC WEAPONS
B61-7 Bomb              10/66   0.3 to 340   AF      610*  207    297
B61-11 Bomb              1/96   0.3 to 340   AF       50    17     24
B83/B83-1 Bomb           6/83   low to 1200  AF      600** 720    678
W76 for Trident I C4     6/78       100      Navy   3200   320    689
W88 for Trident II D5    9/88       475      Navy    400   190    244
W62 for Minuteman III    3/70       170      AF      610   104    187
W78 for Minuteman III    8/79       335      AF      915   308    441
W87-0 for Peacekeeper    4/86       300      AF      525   158    235
W80-1 for ALCM          12/81    5 to 150    AF      400    60    113
W80-1 for ACM            ?/90    5 to 150    AF      400    60    113
NON-STRATEGIC WEAPONS
B61-3/4/10 Tactical Bomb 3/75   0.3 to 170   AF/NATO 750   128    230
W80-0 for SLCM***       12/83    5 to 150    Navy    320    48     90

GRAND TOTAL                                         8780  2320   3341
*   310 of these are in storage.
**  120 of these are in storage.
*** All are stored ashore.

The Hedge and Reliability Replacement Stockpiles
Any functional nuclear weapon that is not in active service is available for use in principle. Most or all of the dwindling backlog weapons now awaiting dismantlement (about 1500 in mid-1998) are probably functional so any of them could be reactivated on short notice. There are two defined classes of warheads that are not on active duty, but will be retained indefinitely as part of the U.S. Enduring Stockpile - the hedge stockpile, and the reliability replacement stockpile. As weapons are taken off operational status over the next several years, they will be placed in one of these two stockpiles instead of being dismantled.

• The Hedge Stockpile. Also called the augmentation or contingency stockpile, this is a stockpile of weapons that are kept in the same condition as operational weapons and can thus be returned to duty on short notice. Weapons in this stockpile can be carried by delivery vehicles that are in service. The hedge stockpile includes (or will include) W62 and W78 Minuteman III warheads, W76 warheads from Trident SLBMs, B61 and B83 bombs, and W80 air-launched cruise missile warheads. The hedge stockpile may also hold some of the recently retired B53 9 megaton bombs, of the estimated 50 that were removed from service only 28 have been reported dismantled, and they are not currently listed as among the weapons awaiting dismantlement.
• The Reliability Replacement Stockpile. Also called the inactive reserve stockpile, this is maintained as a reserve of weapons that can replace active or hedge weapons if any should develop reliability of safety problems. This stockpile is not continuously maintained in operational condition, for example filled tritium reservoirs need not be kept in stock for these weapons. They may also not be able to be carried by in service delivery vehicles without some adaptation effort. This reserve currently contains 50 W-84 ground launched cruise missile (GLCM) warheads. Eventually under the 1994 NPR it will hold about 3000 warheads.

Warhead Retirements

At the end of 1990 the U.S. held some 21,000 operational warheads, plus another 750 retired warheads that were awaiting dismantlement (due to the manufacture of new weapons in the 80s, relatively little effort had been spent on dismantling old ones). In 1990 weapon manufacture ceased, a change that was not entirely intentional but was forced upon the DOE by safety problems at its Rocky Flats and Savannah River plants. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and Pres. Bush's decision to begin reducing U.S. nuclear forces in September 1991, the whole system was put into reverse and reduction and dismantlement became the primary activity. Since that time some 10,500 warheads have been dismantled, and another 1,500 await dismantlement (as of mid-1998) -- a process to be completed by September 2002. As of mid-year 1998 there were approximately 1500 weapons awaiting dismantlement of three types -- the W56 (Minuteman II), the W69 (SRAM) and the W79 (203mm [8 inch] artillery shell). Most of the weapons have been dismantled at the Pantex Plant, some that contained HEU as the sole fissile material were dismantled at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant.

    Pantex Weapon Dismantlements
   FISCAL YEAR        NUMBER OF WEAPONS
1 Oct to 30 Sept
      1990                  1151
      1991                  1595
      1992                  1303 (Y-12 dismantled another 553)
      1993                  1556
      1994                  1369
      1995                  1393
      1996                  1064
      1997                   498

     TOTAL                 10482

Disassemblies of Warheads by Type
        FY 1990-1997*
Warhead/Weapon Type         Number
B28 Bomb                      624
B43 Bomb                      258 
W44 ASROC                     104
W48 155 mm shell              759
W50 Pershing 1A               160
B53 Bomb                       28
W54 SADM                      145
W55 SUBROC                    160
W56 Minuteman II                1 
B57 Bomb                     2242
B61-0, B61-2, B61-5 Bombs    1159
W68 Poseidon SLBM            2468
W69 SRAM                       60
W70 Lance                    1170
W71 Spartan ABM                39
W79-0, W79-1 203mm shells       3

*Does not include disassemblies of types currently in the stockpile.

7.2.1.2 Existing Weapon Infrastructure
Most of the weapons production infrastructure that was constructed during the Cold War has been shut down, much of it is being dismantled. Planshave been formulated to transfer various production and maintenance functions to other facilities as needed, mostly to the U.S. national laboratories: Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore Natational Laboratory (LLNL), and Sandia National Laboratory (SNL). With the termination of weapons tests and production the role of the laboratories have been redefined to be "stockpile stewardship" - maintaining the safety and reliability of the existing stockpile.

All manufacture of nuclear materials for weapons has been halted. There is now a stockpile surplus of U-235, Pu-239, and enriched lithium deuteride.

Tritium has not been produced in the United States since 1988, when the government shut down its last weapons reactor at the Savannah River Site in Aiken, S.C. Weapon retirements will offset tritium decay in stockpile weapons so that no new tritium production will be needed to support the NPR defined post-START II arsenal until 2011 (allowing a 5 year reserve). Until START-II hgoes into effect the DOE is required by congress to continue support a START I-sized arsenal indefinitely. This larger arsenal will require replacement tritium by 2005 (again allowing for a reserve). Planning to develop a new tritium production capability resulted in a decision announced Dec. 1998 by DOE Sec. Richardson to begin producing tritium in the commercial Watts Bar nuclear plant operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority near Knoxville, Tenn with the TVA's Sequoyah nuclear plant outside Chattanooga as a backup. This is the first time a civilian commericial facility has been designated for use in producing nuclear weapons materials in the U.S.

There are two nuclear weapon design labs - LANL and LLNL. Each lab is responsible for supervising and maintaining the weapons it designs. Currently the labs are responsible respectively for the following weapons:

• LANL - B53, B61, W76, W80, W88
  
• LLNL - B83, W87, W84

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)
This weapon design lab competes with Los Alamos. It was established June 1952 near Livermore California and has always operated under a contract with the University of California Board of Regents. The 12.2 square mile facility employed 7,800 people on 25 Nov 1995.

LLNL conducts R&D activities associated with all phases of the nuclear weapons life-cycle, as well as research on non-proliferation, arms control and treaty verification technology. Facilities include the High Explosive Application Facility (HEAF), a tritium facility, the NOVA laser used for Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) research, and the Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS) plant. It is currently planned to be the site for the National Ignition Facility (NIF), a new ICF laser facility.

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)
Opened in 1943 to design atomic bombs as part of the Manhattan Project, Los Alamos has always been operated under a contract with the University of California Board of Regents. This 43.0 square mile facility employed 7,987 people on 25 Nov 1995.

Los Alamos National Laboratory originally manufactured pits in small numbers for weapons tests at its TA-55 (Technical Area-55) plant. This four acre facility is currently the only full-function plutonium handling facility in the U.S. It opened in April 1978 at a cost of $70 million, and houses 400 scientists and engineers. The 150,000 square foot PF-4 (Plutonium Facility-4) is the actual plutonium processing area of TA-55.

In recent years plans have lagged to reestablish pit manufacturing capability at TA-55. In March 1998 LANL announced the successful fabrication of a weapon pit, the first since 1989. By March 2000 TA-55 had produced three engineering pits for the W88, but were projecting that a certifiable weapons pit would only be available "in the next few years" (originally this milestone was slated for 2000). The Stockpile Stewardship Environmental Impact Statement called for Los Alamos to develop the capability to make 20 to 50 pits a year eventually; current DOE plans call for Los Alamos to be able to fabricate up to 20 war-reserve pits a year by 2007. Los Alamos will also support stockpile maintenance by requalifying 100 pits a year (this implies a remanufacturing lifecycle of at least 250 years for all active weapons, and nearly 50 years for requalification). Current estimates of pit lifetime range from 30 to 90 years.

Los Alamos also loads targets with tritium for use by Sandia in manufacturing neutron generators under the NTTL (Neutron Tube Target Loading) project. In 1999 NTTL loaded 450 targets for Sandia for the W76 warhead.

Until FY 1984 Los Alamos had the capability to fabricate and assembly nuclear weapon test devices. This function was terminated due to persistent security problems, and is now handled by the Nevada Test Site.

Nevada Test Site (NTS)
Located 65 miles from Las Vegas, NTS was established as a nuclear weapon test range in 1951 with its first nuclear test (January 27, 1951). The last nuclear test was on 23 September 1992. A total of 928 total tests (100 atmospheric, 828 underground) are known to have been conducted there. The 1,350 square miles facility employed 4,901 people on 25 Nov 1995.

NTS is currently the only U.S. facility capable of manufacturing nuclear explosive devices. With U.S. nuclear explosion tests permanently terminated, its function has shifted to sub-critical tests with high explosives and fissile material in enclosed test chambers. In mid-1993, construction was completed on the $100 million Combined Device Assembly Facility, a 100,000 square foot building within a highly secured 22 acre portion of the test site. The facility includes five high explosives containment cells, called "Gravel Gerties," three weapon assembly bays, two radiographic areas and storage bunkers.

Pantex Plant
This 16.6 square miles facility, located near Amarillo, Texas, has long been the sole facility for the assembly/disassembly of nuclear warhead and bombs. It has not produced any weapons for nine years, the last new nuclear weapon (a W88 warhead) was assembled on 31 July 1990. It is now performing dismantlement operations only, along with a modest evaluation program that involves disassembling and reassembling about 60 warheads a year for stockpile reliability purposes. By 2000, when the current backlog of weapons has been dismantled, Pantex will reestablish a modest standby manufacturing and remanufacturing capability. Over the period 1990-1996 Pantex averaged 1347 dismantlements a year. This fell to only 498 in 1997 when a number of accidents, including the cracking of a pit during disassembly, caused all work to halt for a time.

In operation since May 1952, it is run by the Mason and Hanger-Silas Mason Company. It employed 3,348 people on 25 Nov 1995, and remains staffed at close to this number in 1999. Staffing is projected to fall to 1600 in 2003 when the current dismantlement program is completed. Its current annual operating budget is $265 million.

Pantex currently stores pits from disassembled weapons (eventually most or all of these will be moved to a planned facility at SRS). In mid-1998 it had 10500 pits in storage and had upgraded its pit storage capability to 12000. As of mid-year 1998 there were approximately 1500 weapons awaiting dismantlement of three types -- the W56 (Minuteman II), the W69 (SRAM) and the W79 (8 inch artillery shell). When the current backlog of weapons awaiting dismantlement is cleared (planned date September 2002) this storage capacity will be full.

On 6 Feb. 1996, the DOE declared that Pantex holds 21.3 tonnes of weapon-grade plutonium (and 16.7 tonnes of highly enriched uranium) considered excess inventory including planned dismantlements, this represents the plutonium from some 7000 pits. 5000 additional pits, containing 15 tonnes of plutonium, are being retained in the strategic reserve.

Sandia National Laboratory (SNL)
Sandia was established to provide engineering services for the development of nuclear weapons at the end of WWII. Its 11.9 square mile main facility is located inside Kirtland Air Force Base near Albuquerque, New Mexico; it has a 413 acre branch laboratory near Livermore. It is operated by the Lockheed Martin Sandia Corp. and employed 8,527 people on 25 Nov 1995. More recent figures (Jan. 1999) are about 6,600 people in Albuquerque and another 900 in Livermore.

SNL has taken over production responsibility for neutron generators (initiators) from the now closed Pinellas Plant, and a contingency capacity to produce thermal batteries, where they were originally manufactured. Equipment has been transferred from the Pinellas plant and installed at Sandia and personnel have also been moved from the Pinellas plant. The first thermal battery production was expected in 1998 and delivery of the first Sandia-produced neutron initiator in 1999. At full capacity Sandia expects to be able to produce 500 neutron initiators per year.

Savannah River Site (SRS)
Located near Aiken, South Carolina, Savannah River was established to be the primary production site of nuclear materials for weapons in 1952 at the height of the Cold War. This capability has now been completely shut down. The 300 square mile facility contains deactivated production facilities occupying 16 square miles. It employed 16,655 people on 25 Nov 1995. Its current weapon-related work focuses on tritium handling, and managing the radioactive waste left over from the production of plutonium and tritium.

In Dec. 1998 DOE Sec. Richardson also announced that a new $500 million plant to disassemble the pits (plutonium cores) of nuclear bombs would be built at Savannah River. The facility will disassemble nuclear pits and convert the recovered plutonium metal to an oxide form suitable for disposition. Disposal methods would include fabricating the plutonium oxide into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, which would be burned in existing domestic reactors, and immobilization of the plutonium in ceramic surrounded by vitrified high level waste. The DOE is currently conducting a demonstration of a prototype pit disassembly and conversion system at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The demonstration, which involves dismantling of pits over a two-to-three year period, provides information for designing and operating the full-scale pit disassembly and conversion facility. The full-scale facility is to be designed and constructed over 1999-2004, with production operations beginning in 2005. Up to 50 tonnes of plutonium is expected to be disposed of by this facility. Construction and operation of the full-scale facility is contingent on reaching agreement with Russia on plutonium disposition.

Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR)
Located at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, this was one of the two original production sites for nuclear weapons material established by the Manhattan Project, the selection of this site was on September 19, 1942 (code named Site X) was in fact the first major decision taken as part of the Project. The reservation covers 55.1 square miles and has three main facilities located on it - the 4.5 square mile Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), the 1.3 square mile Y-12 Plant, and the 2.3 square miles K-25 Plant. It is currently operated by Lockheed Martin Energy Research Corporation and employed 14,639 people as of 9/30/97. Its 1997 budget was $1.1438 billion (not including DOE's Oak Ridge Operations Office).

Originally the K-25 and Y-12 plants both produced enriched uranium for the Manhattan Project. Later the function of Y-12 was switched to manufacturing materials for thermonuclear weapons (enriched lithium-6) and the thermonuclear secondaries themselves. It has also held the responsibility for fabricating enriched uranium components for weapons. It now has responsibility for dismantling secondaries from disasembled weapons, and maintains custody of U.S. stocks of weapons grade enriched uranium, and the reserve stockpile of secondaries that are kept intact. ORR also produces weapon components to support to support the activities of the design laboratories and the Nevada Test Site and fabricates fuel materials for the naval nuclear reactor program.

Over the years ORR has produced some 483 metric tons of uranium-235, and 442.4 metric tons for nuclear weapons. Currently 189 metric tons of uranium-235 and 3.0 metric tons of low-enriched uranium are stored at the Y-12 Plant, 1.5 metric tons of uranium-235 at the K-25 Plant, and 1.4 metric tons of uranium-235 and some uranium-233 at ORNL. 84.9 metric tons of this uranium-235 declared excess by President Clinton on March 1, 1995.

Other Facilities
Nearly all non-nuclear bomb components are manufactured at the the Kansas City Plant operated by the Bendix Kansas City Division of Allied-Signal. This 136 acre facility (containing 3.2 million square feet of process building space) was opened in 1949 and employed 3,291 on 25 Nov 1995.

The existing U.S. gaseous diffusion enrichment facilities at Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio are owned and operated by the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC, established by the Energy Policy Act of 1992). On 11 May 2001 the Portsmouth plant ceased operation and USEC consolidated all enrichment activity at the Paducah plant. This plant only produces low-enriched uranium. In January 1991, the NRC received an application to construct and operate the nation's first privately owned uranium enrichment facility in Homer, Louisiana; a project that was later abandoned. The only facility for producing uranium hexafluoride is the Allied-Signal plant in Metropolis, Illinois.

In the early 1990s, shortly after the demobilization of nuclear weapons begun by Pres. Bush, the Pantex Plant in Texas had more U.S. nuclear weapons than any other site in the world, over 5000, although none of them were part of the active stockpile. By mid-1997 this number had declined to only 350, the largest number of nuclear weapons were now being held at Kirtland AFB in New Mexico with 2850. Only 450 of these warheads were operational, 1400 of them slated for dismantling, and another 400 are held as part of the U.S. reserve stockpile. The inactive warheads are held in the 58 storage bays and bunkers of the Kirtland Underground Munitions Storage Complex (KUMSC), a new 300,000 square foot facility opened in 1992 at a cost of $30 million. Because of Kirtland, New Mexico has more nuclear weapons than any other state.

Kings Bay Naval Base in Georgia has more operational nuclear warheads stationed there than any other U.S. base in the world with 2000, although a substantial portion of these are on patrol at sea at any given time (also making Georgia the state with the most operational warheads). Second place is Bangor Naval Base in Washington state with 1600. The Air Force base with the most warheads is Nellis AFB in Nevada (home of Area 51) with 1450, second place is F.E. Warren AFB in Wyoming (950).

Only 150 warheads were deployed overseas (not counting ballistic missile submarines on patrol), al of them B-61 tactical thermonuclear bombs based in Europe.

U.S. DEPLOYMENT/STORAGE SITES
STATE          WARHEADS       LOCATIONS

New Mexico      2850          Kirtland AFB
Georgia         2000 		  Kings Bay 
Washington      1600          Bangor 
Nevada          1450          Nellis AFB
Wyoming          950          F.E. Warren AFB
North Dakota     805          Minot AFB (805) 
Montana          600          Malmstrom AFB
Missouri         550          Whiteman AFB
Texas            520          Pantex Plant (350), Dyess AFB (170)
Louisiana        455          Barksdale AFB
Nebraska         255          1 site
California       175          North Island NAS - San Diego
Virginia         175          Yorktown NAS - Norfolk
South Dakota     170          Ellsworth AFB
Colorado         138          1 site

Approx. Total  12700

FOREIGN DEPLOYMENT/STORAGE SITES
COUNTRY
Germany          Buechel, Memmingen, Norvenich, Ramstein (U.S. base)
United Kingdom   Lakenheath (U.S. base)
Turkey           Balikesir, Murted, Incirlik (U.S. base)
Italy            Ghedi-Torre, Aviano (U.S. base)
Greece           Araxos
Netherlands      Volkel
Belgium          Kleine Brogel
Europe Total     150

DELIVERY SYSTEMS: 2007
WEAPON SYSTEM   NUMBER  WARHEAD NUMBER        YIELD (kt)  TOTAL WARHEADS
                           AND TYPE             
ICBM
Minuteman III   450-500  1 x W87-0             300        450-500 
SLBM/SUBMARINE
Trident II D5     256    5 x W76               100        1280
                   80    5 x W88               475         400
Ohio Class         14   24 x Trident I/II       -          336 missiles
AIRCRAFT
B-52H Stratofort.  33   12 x W61/W83        10 to 1200     396
                   33   20 x ALCM/ACM/bomb   5 to 1200     660
B-2A Spirit        20   16 x B-61/83 bombs low to 1200     320
CRUISE MISSILES
ALCM (AGM-86B)           1 x W80-1           5 to 150
ACM                      1 x W80-1           5 to 150    


PROJECTED STOCKPILE: 2007

OPERATIONAL
WARHEAD/WEAPON          FIRST    YIELD (KT) USER   NUMBER TOTAL YIELD (MAX) 
                      PRODUCED                             Mt   Equiv. Mt
STRATEGIC WEAPONS
B61-7/B61-11 Bomb       10/66    10 to 300   AF      420   126   188
B83/B83-1 Bomb           6/83   low to 1200  AF      500   600   564
W76 for Trident II D5    6/78       100      Navy   1280   128   276 
W88 for Trident II D5    9/88       475      Navy    400   190   243
W87-0 for Minuteman III  4/86       300      AF    450-500 150   224
W80-1 for ALCM/ACM      12/81    5 to 150    AF      400    60   113

NON-STRATEGIC WEAPONS
B61(-3,4,10) Tact. Bomb  3/75   0.3 to 175   AF/NATO 600   105   188
W80-0 for SLCM          12/83    5 to 150    Navy    350    53    99
GRAND OPERATIONAL TOTAL*                            4450  1412  1895
*Plus an additional 500 spares

INACTIVE RESERVE STOCKPILE
W76 for Trident II D5    6/78       100      Navy   450     45    97
W78 for Minuteman III    8/79       335      AF     900    302   434
W84 GLCM Warheads                  10-50      ?     350     18    47
Bombs and cruise missiles         5 - 9000?  AF     800   1000? 1000?
GRAND INACTIVE RESERVE TOTAL                       2500

Principal sources for the section on the United States are:

• TheNRDC Nuclear Notebook prepared by Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin of the Natural Resources Defense Council; monthly installments of which are published in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists;
• Stephen Schwartz and The Brookings Institute; The Department of Energy;
• News stories from the Washington Post and New York Times;
• News agency stories from Associated Press, Agence France-Presse, Itar-Tass, and Reuters.

The Russian nuclear arsenal remains in an uncertain state of flux due to the direct and indirect consequences of the breakup and economic collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia completed the redeployment of nuclear weapons from the territory of the non-Russian former Soviet republics by November 1996, but now faces severe funding problems for maintaining a standing strategic weapons force. The existing Russian nuclear arsenal, largely built up in the 1970s and early 1980s, is reaching the end of its useful service life. In September 1997 Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, chief of the Russian strategic rocket forces, stated that 62 percent of Russia's ICBMs are beyond their guaranteed service life. In late November 1998, Anatoly Perminov, chief of the strategic missile force's general staff, put the figure at 58 percent. Remanufacturing the existing weapons as the US is currently doing is costly, and Russia appears to lack the engineering and industrial resources to undertake such an effort. Much of the original industrial base for these weapons was located in now independent former republics, particularly Ukraine. The alternative, which Russia is pursuing, is to to replace existing weapons with new ones. The severe budget crisis makes replacing existing weapons on a one-for-one basis impossible.

Although under the START II treaty Russia is permitted 3500 warheads, it has been clear for a number of years that maintaining this number exceeded the resources of Russia. One of the first official indications of this was at a stockpile planning at a review held by Pres. Boris Yeltsin on 6 July 1998. At this review Yeltsin used the proposed START III levels of 2000-2500 warheads as the basis of stockpile planning. Most estimates of Russia's likely nuclear forces over the next decade are sharply lower than this however.

Prior to the July 1998 review, prominent Russian strategist Lev Volkov estimated that Russia may have only 700 warheads by 2007. Sergei Kortunov, a top Kremlin defense aide, has written that "with a lot of effort" Russia might climb back to 1,000 warheads by 2015. Perhaps the most serious indication of the straits Russia's nuclear forces are in, because of its official imprimatur, came in October 1998. News organizations reported that a secret report to the Russian Duma by First Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov, a former top Soviet-era military-industrial planner, had estimated that Russia may well be able to field only 800 to 900 nuclear warheads by 2005. These estimates are notable in that they address Russian capability regardless of what the official policy might be.

Since shortly after coming to power at the beginning of 2000, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has advocated a START III limit of no more than 1,500 warheads. On 13 November 2000 he moved even beyond that, arguing that that the number for START III should go even lower, though he cited no specific figure. On the other hand Putin has also stated that reductions in the Russian nuclear arsenal is contingent on the U.S. abstaining from deployment of a national ABM system, and that Russia would not unilateraly reduce its arsenal. Given Russia's inability to maintain even its highest priority strategic programs on track (see the Topol-M below) it is questionable whether Putin can make good on these commitments to maintain the existing force structure if events call on him to do so.

By contrast, according to the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington, the Soviet Union in 1990 had 10,779 strategic nuclear warheads (this excludes an estimated 6,000 to 13,000 non-strategic warheads which have never been covered by arms control treaties.)

The pressure from such hard realities was no doubt a significant factor in bringing the START II treaty, which had been awaiting action by the Russian State Duma (the lower chamber of parliament) for 7 years, to a vote for ratification on 13 April 2000. It passed by a 288 to 133 vote, but with conditions that required U.S. Senate approval before the treaty could enter into force.

Drastic reductions in the Russian arsenal possibly moved closer to becoming official policy in July 2000, when Gen. Anatoly Kvashnin, chief of the general staff, proposed a radical reform of the strategic missile force. His plan, as reported by Izvestia, was to cut the number of land-based missile launchers from 756 to 150 by the year 2003; eliminating 16 or 17 missile troop divisions (leaving 2 or 3); and firing 3,000 rocket specialists. The newspaper said he also proposed drastically reducing the production rate of the single-warhead Topol-M missile, from 10 a year (the rateof the rpevious year) to two a year. As a result, the nuclear forces' share of the military budget would be reduced from 18 percent today to 15 percent. This plan would subordinate the missile troops -- now an independent branch -- to the regular army, and enhance the role of the general staff over the nuclear forces.

Not surprisingly Defense Minister Marshal Igor Dmitriyevich Sergeyev, a former head of the missile troops, strongly objected to this proposal, even threatening to resign. Sergeyev had previously proposed establishing a single command over all nuclear forces, along the lines of the US Strategic Command, an idea intended to provide a substantial simplification of command and control for the Russian nuclear forces as they grew smaller, but maintaining its top level ranking as an equal to the Air Force, Navy, and Army. Currently, control over nuclear weapons passes through the General Staff, which oversees the various services in combat.

PM Putin tabled Kvashnin's proposal at the time without rejecting it, but then at the end of the month fired 6 generals closely associated with Sergeyev in a move widely considered to be a signal about the debate. The other shoe finally dropped on 27 April 2001, when the new Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov (replacing Sergeyev) downgraded the Strategic Rocket Force from being a separate branch of the military, replacing the Sergeyev loyalist Commander-in-Chief Vladimir Yakovlev with Nikolai Solovtsov, but with only the rank of Commander. Sergei Ivanov had been on the job four weeks, and was formerly head of Putin's Security Council where he had overseen the development of military refrom plans.

If the rest of Kvashin's plan is now implemented, it would probably reduce the ICBM force to a mere 150 warheads, retiring 3400 warheads and leaving Russia with no more than 2100 even if all other forces no one the books remained. Some reports have said that Kvashin suggested a total force of only 550 warheads. It should be noted that the actual number of Topol's finally deployed in 2000 was no more than 6 and may have been as few as 3 - down sharply from 10 the year before, and dramatically from the 20 originally planned for 2000. Thus actual Topol procurement rates now also seem to be reflecting Kvashin's proposals.

The most significant strategic program undertaken by Russia in recent years was the deployment of the operational regiments of Topol-M ICBMs (designated as either RT-2PM or RS-12M2 and designated SS-27 by NATO). This is the first missile to be built exclusively in Russia.

The Topol-M was designated as the highest priority defense program. In contrast to other state defence programs, the Topol-M production program was fully funded in the 1998 budget. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, head of the RVSN, said that just to build the Topol-Ms, which cost about $30 million apiece, "will require the concentration of all our resources."

The first test flight of this missile was 20 December 1994, it successfully completed its initial six flight test schedule on 9 December 1998 with a launch from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in northern Russia. The regiment was declared operational by Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev on 27 December 1998 at a strategic missile base in Tatishchevo, near the Volga River city of Saratov. The first two missiles were actually installed at the base in old SS-19 silos near in December 1997.

The Topol-M is being deployed as a single warhead missile although it is capable of carrying three warheads. It has a range of 10500 km, and is suitable for silo or mobile basing. It has improved reliability and operational features, including an improved road-mobile launcher and turning radius, and succeeds the SS-25 Topol. Like its predecessor it is an inertially guided three-stage solid-fuel missile. The missile's launching weight is 47 tonnes, the payload (warhead weight) is one tonne. The missile's length without the warhead is 17.9 meters, and the maximum diameter of the body is 1.86 meters.

According to Maslyukov, who is in charge of the Russian military-industrial complex, the original plan was to deliver to the Russian Strategic Missile Force (RVSN, or Strategic Rocket Force - SRF - in English) 10 Topol-M missile systems in 1998, 10 in 1999, 20 in 2000, after which a production level of 35 to 45 a year would have been achieved. In the Soviet era, the Votkinsk factory, which builds the Topol-M in the central Urals mountains, made about 80 missiles a year. In actual fact, the deployed force at the end of 2000 was 24 to 26 Topol (the exact number is unclear), with only 4 to 6 being delivered in 2000 (some reports say only 3 were made operational). So it appears that even this one program is in serious trouble, and may be stretched out greatly.

Russia is also working on keeping existing systems in operation as long as practical. To support this effort the RVSN made a successful test launch of an RS-22 ICBM (known as the SS-24 Scalpel by NATO) with multiple warheads from a railway missile system on 10 December 1998. The launch from Plesetsk tested the deployment of 10 warheads and "hit targets at the Kamchatka test site with high precision," according to the Interfax news agency.

Under the Nunn-Lugar Act, a program named for its originators originated by Senators Richard Lugar and Sam Nunn, D-Ga., the United States has spent more than $400 million each year since 1991 to help Russia dismantle its old Soviet weapons, and plans to allocate an additional $440 million in 1999.

Under the 'swords for plowshares' deal signed in January 1994 to dispose of excess weapons material, the U.S. Government will purchase 500 tonnes of HEU from Russia for dilution, for US$11.9 billion. Under the Russian-U.S. agreement the United States Enrichment Corporation will purchase a minimum of 500 tonnes of military HEU over 20 years, commencing with 10 tonnes for the first five years and not less than 30 tonnes per year thereafter. The weapons-grade is to be blended down to 4.4% U-235 in Russia and the Russians intend to use 1.5% U-235 for this, to minimize the levels of U-234 in the product. In the short term the military uranium is likely to be blended down to 20% U-235, then stored. In this form it is not usable for weapons.

The blending down of 500 tonnes of military HEU will result in about 15,000 tonnes of low-enriched uranium over 20 years. This is equivalent to about 150 000 tonnes of natural uranium, or approximately three times western world demand in 1993. The dilution of 10 tonnes of military HEU per year for the first five years will displace approximately 3,700 tonnes of uranium oxide production per year, equivalent to output from a medium to large uranium mine. By 2000 the dilution of 30 tonnes of military HEU will displace about 11,200 tonnes of uranium oxide mine production per year which represents approximately 20% of the western world's uranium requirements.

In 1995 the U.S. Enrichment Corporation received its first shipments of low-enriched uranium from Russia (186 tonnes), derived from six tonnes of weapons-grade material. The first shipment of this to a customer, valued at US$145 million, was made in November, and is presumably now generating electricity.

On 27 April 1997 Nuclear Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov announced that Russia had dismantled almost half of its arsenal, removing nearly 400 tonnes of HEU in the process.

7.2.2.1 Current Nuclear Forces

Over the last few years there has been little change in the formal size of the Russian nuclear forces although their effective size has shrunk slightly due to continuing system deterioration. A Pentagon report issued on 10 January 2001 placed Russia's strategic arsenal at 5,870 operational strategic nuclear warheads in 2000 with 1,130 intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles in working condition (slightly lower than the figures totalled in the table Russian Strategic Forces: January 2001 below).

Current strategic plans are to manufacture the Topol-M (SS-27) to replace most of the ICBMs currently in service. Under START-II Russia can retain SS-19s (downloaded from six warheads to one) and SS-25s in service. The SS-19 is a relatively old system (some have now been in service 20 years) and probably will have to be retired before 2007. The composition and size of Russia's nuclear forces is difficult to project given the uncertainties regarding its actual capability to deploy the Topol-M and maintain existing systems. Russia's failure to maintain even the low initial production rate of the Topol-M, allegedly its highest priority defense project, indiactes that this force component is likely to remain small - fewer than 100 until late in the decade.

The RVSN is organized into four missile armies with headquarters at Vladimir, Omsk, Orenburg, and Chita. There are 19 missile bases, each consisting of a separate missile division. The RVSN's 6th Main Directorate is responsible for nuclear security and custody. As of mid-1998 there were 754 missles of four basic types: 180 SS-18s, 168 SS-19s, and 10 SS-24s in underground silos; 36 SS-24s on railroad cars, and 360 road-mobile SS-25s. 10 silo based SS-27s were added at the end of 1998.

During 2000 the RSVN conducted six launches that verified reliability of its four principle ICBM systems. Three launches were conducted of the new SS-27, the 10th test launch on 9 February, the first operational training launch from Plesetsk on 26 September, and the first launch of a mobile SS-27 on 27 September. One launch was conducted for each of the SS-18 (26 September) as part of a commercial satellite launch from Baikonur, the SS-19 (1 November) with a single warhead, and the SS-25 (11 October). These three launches will assist in keeping these missiles in service for a few more years.

The SS-18 is the largest nuclear missile ever deployed, and the most destructive remaining nuclear delivery vehicle in the world. It is believed that the 25 megaton unitary warhead of the SS-18 is not now in service.

As part of large nation-wide exercise, Russia test launched an array of missile tests on 16 February 2001 at 13:43 Moscow Time (5:43 a.m. EST). The Russian armed forces launched a Topol ICBM from the Plesetsk base in northwestern Russia and a SLBM of unspecified type from a submarine in the Barents Sea off Russia's north coast. Both hit their targets in a test range on the Kamchatka Peninsula some 4,200 miles away in Russia's far eastern extremities, officials said. News reports also said that Air Force bombers test-fired one strategic and two tactical missiles in southern Russia.

The Russian strategic ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force officially consists of 42 boats (down from 62 in 1990) of six types (Yankee-I, Delta-I, Delta-II, Delta-III, Delta-IV, and Typhoon), but only boats of the latter three classes are believed to be in actual operation so the true force is much smaller. At beginning of 2001 only 17 submarines are actually considered operational -- 3 Typhoons, 7 Delta-IVs, and 7 Delta-IIIs. Of the original six Typhoon class subs, one was scrapped in 2000, and two more have been taken out of service. In 1999 only seven SSBN patrols were conducted (down from 37 in 1991), an average of only one submarine on patrol at at time. The remainder are likely kept ready in port as static (but highly vulnerable) missile launchers. During the three months of May-June 1998 Russia reportedly had no SSBNs on patrol. The fleet had been expected to drop to 12 in 2000, with the retirement of five Delta-IIIs from the Pacific fleet, but the operational life of these boats has been extended until 2005. There is speculation that the entire Typhoon may be retired soon. A source of confusion to the uninitiated is that the Typhoon (NATO designation) submarine, is known in Russian as the Akula (shark); a name also unfortunately chose by NATO to designate an entirely different Russian attack submarine.

Operational SSBNs are based on the Kola Peninsula at Nerpichya and Yagalnaya, and on the Kamchatka Peninsula at Rybachi. All the Typhoon-class submarines are stationed with the Northern Fleet at Nerpichya. Nerpichya and Yagalnaya and located close to Polyarnyy on fjords that have access to the Barents Sea. Nerpichya is on Zapadnaya Litsa (Litsa Fjord). All the Delta IV submarines serve in the 3rd flotilla of strategic submarines of the Northern fleet based at Yagelnaya, which is part of the Gadzhiyevo [Gadzhievo] Naval Base. The Delta III submarines are all based at Rybachi located on the southern side of Avacha Bay 15 km from, and opposite, the city of Petropavlovsk.

The production line for the SS-N-23 was reopened for low rate production to keep the Delta-IVs (evidently the soundest SSBN class in the fleet) in operation. Russia conducted a successful test launch of two SS-N-23s from the Delta-IV submarine Karelia on 27 March 2000, and a single launch at 11:00 am (0800 GMT) 27 December 2000 in the Barents Sea from the Northern Fleet Delta-IV submarine Novomoskovsk and successfully hit its target in Kamchatka according to Fleet spokesman Igor Degalo.

There is a new SLBM missile (SS-NX-28) under development, but as of the end of 2000 had not yet been test flown. The keel of the first Borey (Arctic Wind) class ballistic missile submarine was laid on 2 November 1996 at the Severodvinsk Shipyard, one of three planned new subs, but construction was halted in 1998 and has not resumed, the other two have yet been started. Chief of the Navy Adm. Vladimir Kuroyedov has announced that the Borey was being redesigned to accomodate a new missile. No new subs will enter service for several years. The Borey class, if eventually launched, will probably carry twelve SLBMs, each with four warheads. Under the strategic stockpile review held in July 1997, Yeltsin had directed Russian strategic forces to shift to greater emphasis on sea-based missiles by putting half of all warheads on submarines (then at about 30%). This can only be accomplished in the near term by sharp reductions in land forces so that the remaining force is half sea-based.

Of the three legs of the Russian nuclear arsenal, the bomber force has been in the worst state. The premier Russian bomber, the Tu-160 Blackjack, had fallen to a force of only 6, with perhaps as few as two in operational condition by the late 90s. Russia remained committed to reconstituting this force however. On-again/off-again plans to purchase 19 Blackjacks inherited by Ukraine sputtered along for several years due to lack of funds, but finally a deal was struck in October 1999 with Ukraine now deeply in debt to Russia for natural gas deliveries, to exchange the bombers for debt relief. Eight of these have been returned to Russia from the Ukrainian base at Priluki and refurbished to return them to service. The Kazan Gorbunov production line for the Blackjack was shut down in 1994, but efforts to complete 6 remaining partially built planes appear to have largely succeeded with one being delivered in May 2000 and 4 new aircraft now located at Zhukovsky Test Center. This has brought the Tu-160 force up to 15 aircraft, and Russia may succeed in rebuilding a force of as many as 20 Blackjacks in the next few years. With this increase in the Tu-160 force Russia has created a second unit, the Blackjack force is now organized into a new unit, the 22nd Donbass Guard Heavy Bomber Aviation Division. As part of the exchange Ukraine also sent three Tu-95MSs and 575 cruise missiles to Russia. The Tu-95 Bear force has declined from 87 in 1998 to 63 in 2001: 29 Tu-95 MS6 and 34 Tu-95 MS16s. These are organized into the 79th Heavy Guard Bomber Regiment at Ukrainka Air Force Base, and the 121st Heavy Bomber Regiment at Engels AFB, near Saratov.

Current Deployment Locations

ICBM 
SS-18: Aleysk, Dombarovski, Kartaly, and Uzhur (186 total)
SS-19: ?
SS-24 M1: Bersht, Kostroma, and Krasnoyarsk (12 each)
SS-24 M2: Tatishchevo (10)
SS-25: ?
SS-27: Tatishchevo (10)
(Only 8 of 19 bases listed)

BOMBERS
Bear:       Ukrainka
            Engels Air Base
Blackjack:  Engels Air Base (15)

SUBMARINE
Nerpichya (Kola Peninsula): Typhoon (3)
Yagalnaya (Kola Peninsula): Delta IV (7)
Rybachi (Kamchatka Peninsula): Delta III (7)

Due to the disordered state of Russian affairs in general, and military affairs in particular, it is difficult to estimate the actual available nuclear forces. The figures given below are the maximum available forces. The actual effective SLBM and aircraft forces may be only a fraction of those indicated. At one point during the summer of 1995 only one Typhoon SLBM boat was deployed. Few, if any, Blackjacks are currently operational. Some of the forces that have become unavailable due to maintenance and support problems may eventually be reactivated.

Russia now has nine power stations operating 29 nuclear reactors Jan. 2001), with 29 gigawatts of electrical capacity; this represents 14.4% (1999) of total electricity generated in Russia.

Russia has four uranium enrichment facilities, in Ekaterinburg, Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk and Angarsk, with a total annual enrichment capacity 20 million SWU. Isotope separation has gone through several stages of development: gaseous dynamic nozzle technology, gaseous diffusion, and gas centrifuge. Russia is currently using 50% of her enrichment capacity for domestic and export production, and is thus aggressively marketing her high technology centrifuge separation capacity.

Principal sources for the section on Russia are:

• TheNRDC Nuclear Notebook prepared by Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin of the Natural Resources Defense Council; monthly installments of which are published in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists;
• News stories from the Washington Post;
• The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA);
• News agency stories from Associated Press, Agence France-Presse, Itar-Tass, and Reuters.

7.2.3 Britain

Britain was the first country to seriously study the feasibility of nuclear weapons, and made a number of critical conceptual breakthroughs. The first theoretically sound critical mass calculation was made in England by Frisch and Peierls in Feb. 1940; and from 10 April 1940 to 15 July 1941 the MAUD Committee headed by Tizard worked out the basic principles of fission bomb design and uranium enrichment by gaseous diffusion. The work done by the MAUD Committee was instrumental in alerting the U.S. (and through espionage, the USSR) to the feasibility of fission weapons in WWII. A high level of cooperation between Britain, the U.S., and Canada continued through the war, formalized by the 1943 Quebec Agreement. Britain sent "the British Mission", a team of first rank scientists to work at Los Alamos. The mission made major contributions to the Manhattan Project, and provided the nucleus for British post-war atomic weapons development effort.

Due to U.S. secrecy the collaboration with the UK broke down at the end of the war, leaving Britain to pursue nuclear weapons on its own. The British nuclear weapons went through a phase of aggressive development and testing (within the UK's financial constraints) of its own indigenous designs during the 1950s. With the resumption of close contact with the U.S. on nuclear weapons technology in 1958, the UK acquired access to the latest weapons technology of the much larger and more advanced U.S. program and switched to using U.S. nuclear weapon designs, adapted to the needs of British service. The UK also began using some U.S. delivery systems, particularly U.S. SLBM systems, the Polaris and later the Trident.

7.2.3.1 Current Nuclear Forces

A comprehensive Strategic Defense Review was completed by the Labor government in March 1988 that resulted in a major revision in Britain's strategic nuclear posture in July. Effective immediately all WE177 bombs were removed from service, and all of them (175 WE 177 A and B bombs - with yields of 200 and 400 kt) were dismantled by the end of August. This left only a single nuclear weapon system in service - the Trident submarine.

This system too was significantly scaled back. The final seven Trident II missiles that had been planned were cancelled (saving 50 million pounds and writing off another 40 million), leaving the UK with a total missile inventory of 58. The number of submarines on patrol at any given time was reduced to one, and the number of warheads deployed on a submarine was reduced to 48 (half of what had been planned, and identical to the force loading on its previous Polaris fleet). The SDR also announced that Britain would hold its arsenal to "a stockpile of fewer than 200 operationally available warheads". The UK was already believed to have fewer than 200 Trident warheads, although the number could have eventually gone as high as 248 under previous MoD directives. In the fall of 1998 the Trident warhead was still apparently in production but probably ended early in 1999.

The first batch of British Trident warheads were completed in September 1992. They were designed by the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Aldermaston, and are assembled at Aldermaston and Burghfield. The warheads are though to have similar characteristics to the U.S. W-76 now on U.S. Trident I and II missiles. The British Trident warheads are capable of selective yield, ranging from under a kiloton up to the full yield of 100 kt or so (this appears to differ from U.S. SLBM warheads). Yields are probably 0.3 kt, 5-10 kt and 100 kt.

In keeping with the reduced operational tempo, only a single crew for each submarine will be maintained. Furthermore the missiles are kept in a de-targeted state. The SDR further declares that "the submarines will routinely be at a 'notice to fire' measured in days rather than the few minutes quick reaction alert that we sustained throughout the Cold War."

The SDR points out that the implied maximum arsenal of 192 warheads "is a reduction of a third from the maximum of 300 announced by the previous government and represents a reduction of more than 70% in the potential explosive power of the deterrent since the end of the Cold War". It is quite possible that the actual warhead stockpile is somewhat smaller than the maximum figure of 192. Only 174 warheads are required to fully equip the entire missile inventory at the specified force loading, but some additional ones would be kept as spares.

The SDR confirmed plans for the Royal Navy to complete the construction of four Vanguard-class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The first submarine of the class, the HMS Vanguard, went on its first patrol in December 1994. The second, the Victorious, entered service in December 1995. The Vigilant was launched in October 1995 and entered service in the autumn of 1998. The final sub, the Vengeance, was launched on 19 September 1998 at Barrow-in-Furness, and was commissioned 27 November 1999. The Vengeance completed shakedown trials and entered operational service 12 February 2001. It is expected to go on patrol as part of the First Submarine Squadron in early 2001. The SDR anticipates keeping this force in service for at least 30 years.

The 58 missile bodies being procured are fewer than the 64 required to completely equip all four boats, so rotating missiles between submarines will be required. But since only one Trident submarine will be kept on patrol, it will be easy to have one submarine out of service - undergoing refitting and maintenance - at any given time, requiring only 48 missiles for the three active boats. This is similar to the practice the UK followed with its previous submarine fleet, the Resolution class Polaris missile subs. The UK produced only enough warheads for three of the four boats, so that warheads were rotated from boats in port to ones that were setting out on patrol. Typically two Trident submarines may actually be at sea at any given time, one going or coming back from patrol while the other is on duty. In a crisis three boats could be put to sea fairly quickly with up 144 warheads (120 or so is a more likely figure).

The Trident II missiles are not actually owned outright by the UK. Instead the Trident II missiles belong to a pool of missiles managed by the United States and stored at Kings Bay, Georgia. British boats pick up their load of missiles at Kings bay when they are commissioned and exchange them there when missiles need servicing. The Trident warheads are mated to the missiles on-board the submarine at the Royal naval Armament Depot at Coulport.

Although the average number of warheads per missile will be 48, the actual distribution of warheads on missiles is uncertain. Beginning in 1996 the UK adopted the strategy of "sub-strategic deterrence". This is basically the same idea as the U.S. policy of "flexible response". It entails having a range of nuclear options, especially limited ones. Some Trident missiles are thus downloaded to a single warhead so that it is possible to launch a strike without using multiple warheads, others will thus have a higher loading. The Trident warheads also offer multiple yields - probably 0.3 kt, 5-10 kt and 100 kt - by choosing to fire the unboosted primary, the boosted primary, or the entire "physics package". According to the 1996 Defence White Paper this policy became fully operational when the Vigilant entered service.

With the entry into service of this last SSBN, barring changes in policy with this or future Administrations, the UK nuclear deterrent has entered a state of stability with no planned changess that may last for decades.

7.2.3.2 Existing Weapon Infrastructure

In the United Kingdom nuclear weapons development, acquisition and deployment now occurs entirely within the organizational structure of the Ministry of Defense (MoD). The organization within the MoD responsible for the development, manufacture, and servicing of nuclear weapons is the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), which is under the authority of the Procurement Executive of the MoD. The AWE came into existence on 1 September 1987 through the merger of the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE) at Aldermaston, and the Directorate of Atomic Weapons Factories (aka the Royal Ordnance Factories, or ROF) at Burghfield and Cardiff. Prior to its transfer to the MoD in 1973, the AWRE had been under the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority since 1954.