This document -- "Historical Outline on the Question of Swiss NuclearArmament" is an English translation of an extract from a Swiss Government report "Historischer Abriss zur Frage einer Schweizer Nuklearbewaffnung". The original report is believed to have been authored in 1996 by Jurg Stussi, who has been described as the Swiss government's senior military historian.
This report was provided courtesy Nicholas Badenhorst, who arranged for its translation by Dr.J. Wozniak, Acting Head, Dept of French-German and Classics of the University of Port Elizabeth.
Jurg Stussi - Lauterburg, April 1996 (Federal Administration, Bern)
This paper consists of an introduction, a chronicle of the years1965 to 1988 and a summary. While the Introduction is largely aresum‚ of known facts from a time for which the files areaccessible to researchers in the Federal Archives, the Chronicleconcerns the subsequent period based on the collection ofinternal files collected by the Head of General Staff, CorpsCommander Arthur Liener, on instruction by the President of theFederal Council, Kaspar Villiger.
Specialised circles of researchers in Switzerland had alreadydevoted attention to the question of the atom bomb before it evenexisted. The physicist Paul Scherrer (1890-1969), Professor atthe Eidgen”ssische Technische Hochschule Zrich (SwissConfederate Technical College)) even succeeded in inviting hisGerman specialist colleague Werner Heisenberg to present a guestlecture in the Limmat-metropolis [i.e. Zrich] and to introducehim to an American who was associated with the Office ofStrategic Services and whose task it was to establish how far theGerman efforts with respect to an atom bomb had progressed.Thomas Powers proves this quite remarkably in his book"Heisenberg's war" (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993, EMB (FederalMilitary Library No.) D 1329) based on the American files. Thefact that Scherrer thereafter became our key man for the furtherdevelopment, is well-known, inasfar as the civilian side ofthings is concerned: The Institutes of Villigen and Wrenlingen,united under his name, are the monument that a practically-oriented people has set to an eminent scholar. Due to a lack ofsource materials (or, respectively, a lack of time to search forand evaluate the materials available in internal and foreign,particularly American archives), it is a open question exactlywhich role Scherrer played in the military endeavour, startingas early as 1945, toward the development of nuclear energy forthe benefit of the country, i.e. for the construction of a bombas a means of dissuasion. However, it has been established thatthe "Study Commission for Nuclear Energy" worked out thefundamental principles since 1945. The Federal Council ofMinisters who officially appointed the SKA (Study Commission forNuclear Energy) on 8 June 1946, requested from Parliament afederal resolution on the promotion of research in the field ofnuclear energy. Karl Kobelt, Minister of State, emphasised themilitary aspects of this issue strongly enough, but also statedthat a nuclear armament was not planned, which was nearly self-evident in the situation of 1946 and given the objectiveconditions; however, this was a rather liberal interpretation ofclassified instructions to the SKA. Had he stated the contrary,he would have made the plan impossible because this would havetriggered irresistible political pressure from abroad. Thesematters have already been, and will continue to be, the subjectof historical investigations.
However, around 1955, it can be assumed that the efforts towardsa Swiss nuclear bomb would have slowed down somewhat. The so-called Chevalier-Initiative of 2 December 1954, named after itsinitiator, which aimed at cutting military expenditure by halfand utilising the funds released thereby in specified projects,was declared null and void by Parliament. Samuel Chevaliersubmitted two further initiatives with similar intent on 17October 1956. His lack of realism was, however, all too clearlyunderlined by the bloody suppression of the uprising of theHungarian people by Soviet tanks as from 5 November 1956. Theacute phase of the Cold War had begun. Decisive factors wouldhave been the shooting down of an American U-2 reconnaissanceaircraft by the Soviet Union in 1960, and the Cuban Crisis in theyear 1962, when a mere word held the balance between the worldand a nuclear exchange of blows: President John FitzgeraldKennedy decreed a Quarantine against Fidel Castro's island. Hadhe, with the exact same behaviour of the American navy, ordereda Blockade, this would have constituted a deed of war underinternational law.
In this situation, where world politics were anything butreassuring, the authorities and sovereign of a neutral smallstate, the majority of whom had been moulded by their experienceof holding out against Adolf Hitler's Reich, had to find a pathto modern security politics. As in other fields, the variousoptions on the issue of a possible nuclear armament were notmerely handled by state offices but also discussed in public.On 29 March 1957, the first meeting of the "Study Commission forthe possible acquisition of own nuclear arms" was held. This wasan organ of the Head of General Staff, Louis de Montmollin, whodeclared the matter as secret and expressly prohibited anycontact with third persons not authorised by himself. The aim wasto give the Federal Council of Ministers an orientation towards"the possibility of the acquisition of nuclear arms inSwitzerland". In March 1957, apart from Montmollin himself, theinitiates were the Lower Chief of Staff, Front Divisional ColonelJacques de Boissier; Colonel in the General Staff, PeterBurckhardt; Professor Doctor Rudolf Bindschedler, Head of LegalServices of the Swiss Federal Political Department; the Delegatefor Issues of Nuclear Energy, Doctor Otto Zipfel; his deputy,Jakob Burckhardt; the Director of the Reaktor AG company, DoctorRudolf Sontheim, as well as General Staff Colonels Henri Hess andGeorg Heberlein. The Swiss Officers Association, on its behalf,approved nuclear arms as a significant reinforcement of nationaldefence in spring of the same year 1957, whereas only a yearlater, the initiative committee for the Swiss Movement againstNuclear Armament began collecting signatures for an Article20bis of the Federal Constitution, which would have prohibited"the manufacture, import, transit, storage and utilization ofnuclear arms of all types". First of all, this challenged theFederal Council of Ministers. On 11 July 1958, the staff releaseda declaration of principle in this matter, which states:"In agreement with our centuries-old tradition of defensivefortification, the Federal Council of Ministers is therefore ofthe opinion that the army must be given the most effectiveweapons for the preservation of our independence and for theprotection of our neutrality. This includes nuclear weapons. TheFederal Council of Ministers has, consequently, instructed theFederal Military Department to continue investigating the issuesarising from the introduction of nuclear weapons into our Army,and to submit to the Federal Council of Ministers at a suitabletime a report on and application for such." The fact that thisdeclaration was criticised, among others, by the Soviet newsagency TASS, could only have a stimulating effect since this wasthe officious statement by the most likely opponent (for theoverall context, compare Dominique Metzler's licentiate thesis"The option of nuclear armament for the Swiss Army (1945-1969)",Aarburg: Dominique Metzler, 1995). Although the officers whoparticipated in the Federal Defense Commission (LVK) which servedas advisor to the Chairman to the EMD (Federal MilitaryDepartment), considered a Swiss atom bomb more as an operativeand tactical measure, there were nonetheless voices such as thatof the commander of the Airforce and Anti-aircraft Corps, EtiennePrimault, who, according to the minutes, declared on 29 November1957, "If one had an aircraft such as the mirage, for example,which is capable of flying to Moscow with atom bombs on board,then a deployment of these in enemy territory could very well beimagined." This opinion, however, was only acceptable as amilitary-technological evaluation of the matter, because,politically, the Federal Council of Ministers had no intentionsat all of making Switzerland into the fourth nuclear power behindthe USA, the USSR and Great Britain. On the contrary, on 7October 1958, Bindschedler declared in an aide-memoire to theSwedish ambassador, "The Swiss Army would be equipped withnuclear weapons only under the condition that the monopoly onnuclear power could no longer be upheld by the three worldpowers. The problem thus only arises once this monopoly no longerexists."
The Federal Council of Ministers did, however, want to be onguard against this case, which was not so unlikely, after all.The Council thus instructed the Federal Military Department (EMD)on 23 December 1958 to investigate the effects, the acquisition,the purchase and the manufacture of nuclear arms and then tosubmit the report and application. Such investigations abroadwere to be conducted "in keeping with all aspects of the policyof neutrality and in close co-operation with the FederalPolitical Department." Research into uranium deposits, mentionedin the same resolution, was considered to be of civil andmilitary importance. The Federal Council of Ministers approvedthe accompanying report from the Finance and Customs Departments,according to which the required credits had to appear separatelyin the budget.
The initiative on the prohibition of nuclear arms was submittedon 29 April 1959. The Social Democratic Party of Switzerland,now also forced to move, submitted its own initiative on 24 July1959 which provided for a compulsory Referendum on the "decisionon equipping the Swiss Army with nuclear arms of whichever type".
The Federal Council of Ministers announced the state of itsevaluation of the situation with its message on the Regulationson Troops on 30 June 1960, stating, "Although the possibility ofacquiring nuclear arms from abroad or manufacturing them insidethe country, is presently lacking, this should not cause us toaltogether sacrifice the concept of this most effectivereinforcement of our military defense of the country. Thedevelopment should be pursued attentively, so that optionsarising at a later stage can then be considered, should thesituation arise."
This was the evaluation by the colleagues. After all, on 14 March1960, Colonel Corps commander Jakob Annasohn, Chief of GeneralStaff, had actually applied to the Federal Military Department(EMD) to obtain offers for the purchase of nuclear arms on acommercial basis from the USA, Great Britain and the SovietUnion, but on the other hand applied to offer France and Swedenco-operation in the area of "essais" [trials]. The FederalCouncil of Ministers refused such ideas altogether. It did notonly reject such negotiations at the time, it also decreed in allformality that "the conducting of such clarifications could onlybe authorised on the basis of a later decision of the FederalCouncil of Ministers."
However, the Swiss attitude gave reason for concern among thenuclear powers (which included France since 13 February 1960),despite the reservation of the authorities. An American sense ofdisquiet, albeit only a hint in the available files, could bediscerned as from 1961. In the same year (on 25 April), theFederal Council of Ministers applied to Parliament to purchasethat aircraft of which Divisional Colonel Etienne Primault hadspoken with much praise in 1957. 100 Mirage III S were to bepurchased for a total 871 million (Swiss) Francs.
In its report on the initiative for the prohibition of nucleararms dated 7 July 1961, the Federal Council of Ministers onceagain expressed its opinion on the issue of a possible nucleararmament, "In our report, we have, on purpose, not mentioned theacquisition of nuclear arms, be it by means of purchase, by owndevelopment or by manufacture under licence. The question remainsopen until an option for acquisition arises, and if this is undersuch conditions that neither affect our sovereignty, nor ourneutrality in any manner whatsoever. This is not the case atpresent. Decisions with respect to the acquisition, which at anyrate would be a matter resorting under the Federal Councils'authority, have therefore neither been taken, nor are theyimminent."
The sovereign power [people's referendum] rejected the initiativeon 1 April 1962 with 537.138 to 286.895 votes. 18 cantons(districts represented in the Upper Chamber of Parliament)declined, 4 consented.
In its supplementary report on the initiative to hold areferendum on nuclear arms, the Federal Council of Ministersadapted the points of emphasis to the other wording in theoriginal document, and subsequently stated, on 15 November 1962:
"Whether our Army can one day be armed with nuclear weapons, isfirst of all a question of military politics and militarytechnology. It would not be responsible from a point of view ofnational defense, to subject the decision on this matter to thepassionate atmosphere of a public referendum, quite apart fromthe fact that situations are conceivable where the equipment ofour army with nuclear weapons would have to be controlled byrigorous secrecy regulations. If these were observed, there wouldbe a risk that the population could come to a wrong decision dueto partial ignorance of the full state of affairs; however, ifone were to transgress these, then we would risk non-delivery ofthe weapons to us or - at best - that their effectiveness wouldbe reduced since their details might also be known to an enemy.On the other hand, a comprehensive and specialist examination ofthis fundamental decision, too, will be guaranteed by the factualatmosphere in the consultations of the commissions of seniorofficials, their experience and specialised knowledge, as wellas by the possibility of providing them with all the necessaryinformation. Only the conventional mode of procuring arms,corresponding to the order of competencies to date, is able toguarantee the optimal status of our uncompromising preparednessfor defense."
To truly appreciate this use of language, one must remember thatPresident Kennedy only lifted the Quarantine on Cuba five dayslater, on 20 November. The majority of Swiss felt threatened asa whole, and in actual fact, since 1963, the valid plan ofoperation of the Warsaw convention as set out by General JanSejna (living in the West since 1968) foresaw that Switzerlandwould be the target of a strategic attack immediately after theoutbreak of a possible war (We will bury you, London: Sidgwick& Jackson, 1982; EMB (Federal Military Library No.) Ve 2024).Naturally, such plans were not known to us here in 1963; however,there was certainly a sense of their existence.
The planners went to work with the appropriate sense ofearnestness in 1963 and 1964. The Lower Chief of Staff forPlanning, Chief Divisional Colonel Eugen Studer, now urged forclarifications with countries abroad, but once again ProfessorBindschedler put a damper on his efforts. In his letter dated 4July 1963, Bindschedler sided with the conclusions of a study onforeign policy and international law which, with a somewhatsybilline tenor reminding of La Charit‚-sur-Loire, had ended onthe note,
[french text] "The possibilities are not encouraging; one could hardly avoid foreseeing normal contacts of the General Staff which could secretly be extended to the issues of the study."
This attitude was, no doubt, in full agreement with the publicopinion of the time, considering that the initiative for areferendum on nuclear arms was rejected with 451.238 against274.061 votes and by 17« estates against 4«.
The accession to the Moscow agreement of 5 August 1963, on theinterdict on nuclear arms experiments in the air, in space andunder water, did not contradict the clarifications for the eventof a possible Swiss nuclear armament. Hence, on 18 December 1963,the correspondent for the National Council Commission, WilliBretscher, said, "We are in a position ... even after signing theagreement, to further pursue the problem of our own nucleararmament, and we shall make our decisions depending on theevaluation of further developments in this field."
This further development which the well-informed chief editor ofthe Neue Zricher Zeitung and statesman, was keeping in mind,could be the own (domestic) manufacture, a joint venture e.g.with Sweden, or, as the Lower Chief of General Staff: Planninghad stated in a communication to the Chief of General Staff on21 October 1963, also "in the purchase of nuclear arms abroad ona purely commercial basis, particularly in France". On 28November 1963, the Lower Chief of General Staff: Planning,calculated costs of 720 million (Swiss) francs over 35 years,initially including 20 million francs for pure research. Shouldthe decision be for Plutonium instead of super-enriched Uranium,then the estimate would be 2.100 million francs over 27 years.The precise action was drawn up on 21 March 1964 by Doctor PaulSchmid in an eleven-page paper entitled Suggestions relevant tothe execution of such preliminary work for a possible nucleararmament, as is of predominantly military importance.
The sub-group Planning had in the meantime developed a conceptof the first-level military demand: "50 aircraft bombs @ 60-100KT (Mirage)" was the designated quantity on 4 May 1964. Studerhimself had, on 8 April, signed a five-page document on the"feasibility of nuclear weapon tests in Switzerland", in whichcavern detonations in a region "where an area with a radius of2-3 km can be sealed off completely" were envisaged. Furthermore,there is proof that Studer still knew, on 30 October 1963, aboutthe Uranium reserve of the Federal State which was by no meansa secret despite the classified stamps on the documents, sinceNational Council member, Alfred Schaller, had, on 8 September1958 in the Schweizer Illustrierte Zeitung, quite openly spokenof "10 tons of natural Uranium", purchased from Belgium, refinedin England", and had furthermore written that "tons" of thismaterial were lying in the "duty of care" of the Wimmis powderfactory. Eugen Studer's studies were further developments of thePossibilities of an own manufacture of nuclear weapons, that 58-page thick, unsigned report which had laid the theoreticalfoundations for a nuclear armament of Switzerland on 15 November1963, and about which the USA had apparently come to hear (muchto its consternation) while it was in preparation. Perhaps theSwiss development would have continued on the track outlined in1958. However, after the message about the additional credit forthe Mirage, dated 24 April 1964, other rules for the game becameevident. On that day, the Federal Council of Ministers decidedto request a further credit of 576 million francs for theacquisition of the Mirages, which triggered a widespread lack ofcomprehension and caused the first parliamentary investigationcommission in the history of the modern federal state. Accuratelyon the same 24th of April, the Chief of General Staff applied tothe Head of the Federal Military Department to make available 20million francs for tracing Uranium sources inside the countrywithin three years, to bring the issue of centrifuges closer toa conclusion and to clarify the issues of nuclear weapontechnology and possibilities for experiments.
Despite the Mirage-affair, the experts were nonetheless convincedto be acting in the interests of the sovereign state. Theatmosphere of 1964 also led to the courageous opinion of anexpert who stated that "the clarification process toward theacquisition of nuclear weapons should not be kept secret from thegeneral public", a point of view that was supported by Annasohn,Head of General Staff, on 14 May at the Chairman of theDepartment, "Dr Schmid has declared that it contradicts hischaracter to constantly have to lie, instead of honestly sayingwhat the clarification process is all about. He is of theopinion, rightfully in my eyes, that the preliminaryclarifications, after all, do not in the least constitute adecision towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Thisdecision will remain entirely and totally excluded."
How a parliamentary decision, necessary at least for the budgetcredit, could be effected under the circumstances of the Mirage-affair, became more and more unclear as the delay continued. On1 September, the commissions of inquiry of the National Assemblyand the Upper Chamber published their report in which thefollowing wording can be found, "Parliament was indeed misled.In the interest of the State, its duty is to ensure that such aprocess will not be repeated. The credibility of messages fromthe Minister's Council must be guaranteed by the Executive." Thenumber of aircraft to be purchased was reduced to 57, and themotion included a demand for a Chief of Armament, a panel ofexperts on defense issues, a clear delineation betweendevelopment and the acquisition of armament material as well asinstructions to secure dates and costs, and the submission oftasks to technical and commercial control.
The Federal Council of Ministers could not have been aware ofthis conclusion by the study-group of the commissions KurtFurgler and Gion Darms on 5 June 1964, but its reaction to theapplications by the EMD was sceptical. Although the colleaguestook note of the report MAP (Possibilities for own nuclear armsproduction) and instructed the EVED (Federal Traffic and EnergyScience Department) and the EMD (Federal Military Department) toassimilate the documents necessary for decision-making overapproximately three years, but the EMD was obliged to reduce thecosts to the activity of one expert in the Department of GeneralStaff, and once again it was stated about contacts abroad,"Before the introduction of the necessary steps, it [the EMD]must obtain the permission of the Federal Council of Ministers."
Schmid and Annasohn's suggestions to conduct the necessaryclarifications quite openly, had remained without consequences.On the other hand it was impossible to uphold secrecy, as thewell-informed interpellation of National Council member, HelmutHubacher, on 9 December 1964 indicates: "Does an instance existwithin the Federal Military Department that concerns itself withthe question of nuclear armament, should the need arise, or withthe mere manufacture of nuclear arms or their testing within ourown country? If so, of which persons does this specialist bodyconsist?" Etienne Primault and Jakob Annasohn had already left.What was the situation of Minister of State, Paul Chaudet? Wouldhe stay and soon, in the election year of 1967, become themortgage for his party, or would he leave and thereby allow theEMD as well as his party to appear weak for the moment?
Scientifically speaking, in 1945, no other small state was betterprepared for the nuclear age than Switzerland. The connectionswhich Paul Scherrer had formed during war times with theAmericans, who were now leading in the field, warranted thisalready. The corresponding self-assurance may have led theFederal Council of Ministers to decide, first in secrecy and in1958 quite openly, to equip the army with the most effectiveweapons, i.e. nuclear arms. In this context, active serviceexperience in the successful self-conservation - thanks to acombination of willingness to compromise and a clearly manifestedwill for self-defense - played as much of a role as the fear ofthe hegemonical claims of the communist superpower, illustratedbeyond doubt in the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956.
However, the process was slowed down considerably due touncertainty whether the feared German nuclear armament would takeplace, also due to a long tradition of democratic legitimationof political decisions, as well as to the permanent battle forrestricted resources. Finally, the people and the chambers ofgovernment gave a stimulating signal by rejecting an initiativetowards the prohibition of nuclear arms on 1 April 1962. A phaseof intensive work began, the most important result of which wasthe report on the possibilities of own nuclear production, in1963. Due to their large extent, these efforts could not be keptentirely secret and are likely to have increased American effortstowards a non-proliferation treaty. Such efforts were mostprobably not directed specifically at Switzerland but ratherreferred to the model that it might parade to others. Thedeciding turn to the Swiss efforts came with the Mirage-affair:on 24 April 1964, the Federal Council of Ministers applied foran additional credit of 567 million francs from Parliament,toward the acquisition of fighter aircraft Mirage-III S. Thisdesire led to a parliamentary investigation, to a reduction innumbers ordered, to the abdication of the Chief of General Staffand of the Commander of the Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Troopsas well as causing a rupture in Parliament's trust in the FederalCouncil of Ministers, and of the Federal Council of Ministers inthe Military Department. These were no times to be granted the20 million francs over three years for which Paul Chaudet hadapplied, particularly not if an overall cost estimate of 720million francs was implied beyond this and since undesirableexperiences had just been made, and were still being made, withsuch amounts for military projects. On 5 June 1964, the FederalCouncil of Ministers thus only granted the employment of aspecialist in the office of the General Staff Department.
Thereby, a contradiction had arisen between the federal aim ofequipping the army with nuclear arms, declared in 1958 and neverrecalled, and the feasible minimum option in view of rigorousconstraints. The Federal Council in 1965, however, was in nohurry to clear up the matter as requested by Paul Chaudet. In adeclaration in the Von Wattenwyl-House on 26 October 1965, thecolleagues finally agreed that the civil aspects of the nuclearissue were the clear priority. On 28 January 1966, the FederalCouncil of Ministers decided in all formality to realise andimplement the measures and work applied for by the Department ofMilitary and the Military Delegation of the Federal Council ofMinisters (but worded by the delegate for issues of nuclearenergy); however, the initiative was to be handed to the EVED(Federal Traffic and Energy Science Department). The concept ofthe country's military defense dated 6.6.66 specified in the sameyear that only a further extension of nuclear arms would forceSwitzerland to decide whether to purchase them or not, and thatthe running clarifications were based on this fact.
Nello Celio who became head of the Military Department in 1967,was sceptical of the nuclear arms issues. He clashed withconcepts that the sub-group planning of the Group for GeneralStaff Services had developed, which stated that a working groupshould be founded, begin operating and grow over 5 years from 15to 52 full-time members. Since Celio was also of the opinion thatit would be wrong to sign the proposed treaty on banning nucleararms without Quid pro quo, he did not give the red light to startappointing a secret Coordination Council based on the decisionof the Federal Council on 28 January 1966, but allowed only twoto three colleagues to dedicate themselves to this theme on afull-time basis. This implied maintaining the freedom of action,but not construction of the bomb.The planning tasks were taken further within the group forGeneral Staff Services. The Operations Section calculated anannual financial budget of 100 to 175 million francs in 1968, forthe development and acquisition on the basis of Uranium which wascheaper. This aimed solely at procuring, until 15 years later,400 nuclear warheads for the existing fighter aircraft, for themissile launchers and for a guided missile system that was stillto be acquired. Apart from other phenomenons implied by the year1968, this was sufficient background for Celio's rejection of theplanned secret Coordination Committee in May 1968. However, theChief of General Staff subsequently achieved a re-evaluation andonce again got the green light; Celio on the other hand movedover to the Finance Department on 1 July 1968, on precisely theday when the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear arms wassigned in London, Moscow and Washington.
From then on, the Finance Department sent clear signs against aSwiss nuclear armament. Hence, in 1969, the Federal FinancialAdministration refused to include 1'500'000 francs for thepurpose of developing Uranium centrifuges, into the 1970 budget.On a political level, the Federal Council of Ministers closed thegap in policy that had already narrowed substantially since theMirage-affair, by its decision to sign the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear arms on 27 November 1969. Even though,in terms of International law, the Swiss renunciation only becameeffective with the ratification on 9 March 1977, the onlyconceivable option now was to provide Switzerland with thenecessary specialist knowledge to be considered a thresholdcountry, which at the same time safeguarded the freedom ofactivity for the event of the treaty being broken. To assure thison a practical level, was the task of the Working Committee forNuclear Issues (AAA) with a Scientific Advisory Council, createdon 30 April 1969 by the EMD (Federal Military Department) inconsultation with the EPD (Federal Political Department), EDI(Federal Department for the Interior) and EVED (Federal Trafficand Energy Science Department). The AAA met altogether 27 timesduring its period of existence (30.4.1969 - 31.12.1988), whichis less than twice a year on average, and this alone proves thatthe issues could not have been more than preparatory measures tokeep open the option of a purchase decision for the FederalCouncil of Ministers, should an entirely different internationalsituation arise; such as a nuclear armament of Germany inconjunction with a failure of the non-proliferation treaty.
The budgeted finance for these tasks was in accordance with thisstate of affairs. For the time from 1970 until 1972, the overalltotal came to SFr. 67'949.30, including the salaries of twophysical scientists who were for a certain time part of theScientific Advisory Council. Chief of General Staff, Johann JakobVischer, declared the cessation of operations of DIORIT inWrenlingen as harmless in military terms, even though this mayhave taken a chip out of the original construction - thedevelopment of specialists particularly suited for armstechnology through work on the heavy water reactor. For furtherwork, Vischer wanted to place the emphasis on enrichmenttechnology, basing his decision also on the judgement of hismilitary specialists. The will to become a nuclear thresholdpower, however, "did not seem clearly distinguishable to him, atleast not on government level".
Due to the ratification decision by the Upper Chamber, who wasthe first instance to handle the business and had originallyrejected the task of preparing an additional report, the year1976 brought about a certain sobering effect among the membersof the AAA and of the Scientific Advisory Board. It was decidedto disband the latter since there was no longer a need for it,but the AAA continued to work further, thanks to a slightlyadapted Decree of 1977.
The theoretical basis for the work of the AAA in the period from1977 to 1988 was constituted by a document entitled SwissPolitics in the Question of Nuclear Armament, edited by LowerChief of Staff: Front, Josef Feldmann. This document concludesthat Switzerland has a vested interest in taking all measurespermitted in the framework of the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty)which are suited to secure its status as a nuclear thresholdpower, and maintain it on a long-term basis." However, thestudies required for this now stood in incessant competition forscarce finance, against other projects which were easier to carryinto the AAA since the disbanding of the Scientific AdvisoryCouncil, and which had nothing to do with the original task butneeded an AAA legitimation, such as measures for protectionagainst the nuclear electro-magnetic impulse (NEMP). Around thistime, the Chief of Armament and his group for armament services -whose posts existed thanks to the Mirage affair and who embodiedthe best qualifications in their field to assess the difficultiesof an eventual acquisition - were steering the discussions in theAAA away from questions on the triggering mechanism and otherconcrete arms-technological issues to other matters, with verveand finally with success. Naturally, this in no way prevented thecompletion of such AAA-tasks as the edition of a technical studyon the rise of Switzerland to a threshold power, which the AAAhad to update periodically. This was a task issued by the Chiefof General Staff, now Hans Senn, on 28 September 1979. Further,Senn's instruction reads: "In the event that the political ortechnological development leads to an entirely new evaluation ofthe situation, the AAA shall in good time apply for the measuresto be taken."
On 12 August 1981 however, the political development seemed togive the Federal Council of Ministers permission to abandon thesecrecy around the Uranium reserves in the State, to place themunder international control within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to transfer the right of control to theEVED (Federal Traffic and Energy Science Department) which hadto be a member of the AAA, but nothing more than that. At least,this is what the colleagues believed to have decided, since theSchweizer Illustrierte Zeitung had, in fact, already publishedthe presence and place of storage of this supply in 1958, whichseems to have been forgotten by everybody in the meantime. Inthe AAA, on several occasions, discussions had been held aroundthe riddle of how to purchase natural Uranium and store it, justto be sure; but no-one had pointed out that five and a half tonsof it were actually already lying in Wimmis.
The decision of the Federal Council of Ministers in 1981 showedclearly that on this level - after all, the AAA still had to beheard due to the remaining insecurity - there was little doubtas to the permanence of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and thatSwiss nuclear armament was now a historical issue.
Indeed, in the AAA, the meaningfulness of nuclear armament becameincreasingly contested during the first half of the 'eighties.Neither the continuation of the (??) WK-work nor new tasks suchas evaluating the possibilities of a so-called do-it-yourselfbomb (Bastlerbombe), a makeshift nuclear bomb, could cover thisfact. The fact remains that mere studies can have substantialimportance, though, as the request of the German military attach‚in 1985 proves: He was perfectly well-informed about the studiescompleted, knew authors and titles and wished to acquire some ofthese now. It is not entirely clear from the files whether he didreceive them; however, the technical secretary of the AAA was notsurprised about this enquiry and furthermore, he applied forpermission to partially grant this request and to do so in a typeof barter, with a corresponding counter-offer. As usual in theintelligence service of all times and countries, there seems toexist a kind of bazaar even in classified science: at least thisseems the obvious conclusion. Two further thoughts immediatelyarise: other countries, too, are occupied with the possibilityof a breakdown of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and are preparingfor this event at least as a theoretical concept. Hence, one canderive that, due to the long duration of the work and thenumerous and unavoidable personal and institutional changes,other things had also been forgotten, apart from the publicationof the Uranium reserves in the "Schweizer Illustrierte", i.e. inthis case the clear federal prohibition on foreign contacts inthis field without express prior permission from the meeting ofcolleagues. Finally, one is impressed by the level of disciplinemaintained, because with only a little imagination, one cancalculate the publicist and political consequences should thematter have become known at the time, even though the exchangeof studies surely did not constitute a breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Within the AAA, the spirit of Geneva initiated by Ronald Reaganand Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 accentuated the question whetherthere was meaning to its endeavour, all the more. On the last dayof this significant year in global history, Divisional CommanderG‚rard de Loes, chairman of the AAA, directed a letter to theMinister of State, Jean-Pascal Delamuraz, and asked him to appealto the Federal Council of Ministers to officially establish thatSwitzerland still wished to be a nuclear threshold country. In1986 De Loes, visibly disappointed by the reserve of theDepartmental Head towards this matter, openly contemplated thedissolution of the AAA, since he allegedly did not have themandate. In reality, he probably lacked the confidence and faiththat the existing mandate was meaningful, which moved him tosecure the backing by the Federal Council of Ministers. In aGRD(Group for Armament Services)-study that was nonethelesscommissioned, the "brisance de la question" (explosive nature ofthe issue) was emphasised and the appropriateness of the matterwas questioned.
The members of the AAA were by no means the only ones to askthese questions. In two questions asked within the span of oneweek in 1987, National Council member, Paul Rechsteiner, wantedto know, among other things, whether the Group for Nuclear Issuesheaded by the EMD (Federal Military Department) still existedwithin the administration and if so, for what reason. The FederalCouncil of Ministers answered that the AAA did still exist, butthat no decision had been taken whether its term of office wouldbe extended again beyond 1988. At this time, the Head of GeneralStaff, Corps Commander Eugen Lthy, had already signalled thathe supported the dissolution applied for by the AAA, as the onlymeaningful task still left in view of the status as a thresholdstate.
Finally, it remained for the AAA to apply for its owndissolution, which was decided unanimously with one abstention.Accordingly, on 1 November 1988, Minister of State, ArnoldKoller, drew the final stoke under the issue of a Swiss nucleararmament.
A AtomicAAA Working committee for nuclear issuesBKW Bern Power PlantsBOA Advisory body for nuclear issuesBR Minister(s) of StateBRB Minister(s) of State decision/resolutionC EMD Head of the Federal Military DepartmentDMV Directorate of the Military AdministrationEDA Federal Department for Foreign AffairsEDI Federal Department for the InteriorEIR Federal Institute for Reactor ResearchEK Supplementary CourseEMB Federal Military LibraryEMD Federal Military DepartmentEMG Major General of StaffEPD Federal Political DepartmentETH Federal College of Technical Higher EducationEVED Federal Traffic and Energy Science DepartmentFA Research CommitteeFSFO Specialist Sections and ResearchGAA Secret Working committee for Questions of Nuclear ArmamentGDA Groupement de l'armement (Group on armament)GRD Group for Armament ServicesKFLF Commando for airforce and anti-aircraft troopsKTA War-technological DepartmentMAP Possibilities for own nuclear arms productionNPT Non Proliferation TreatyRFA Federal Republic of Germany